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Abstract 
This dissertation consists of two essays on forecasting real GDP growth and 
predicting recessions in the United States. In the first essay, we create a new indicator of 
economic activity based on a business cycle pattern, able to better forecast real output 
changes. The second essay utilizes the same indicator with the purpose of improving 
recession forecast. 
The accurate prediction of economic activity is valuable for the business community, 
policymakers, and the general public because better forecasts of GDP growth have the 
potential to improve economic conditions. In the first essay, we create a new indicator based 
on the correlation of residential and non-residential marginal product of capital (MPK) 
estimates and use it to improve forecasts of output growth. The correlation of residential and 
non-residential MPK is highly negative during recessions, while in expansions the same 
correlation is positive.  For six out of seven expansions, the correlation of the two series 
becomes zero between one and three quarters before the subsequent recession. This cyclical 
behavior allows the use of a measure based on the correlation of the MPKs to create a better 
forecast of GDP growth. To this end, we compare the out-of-sample predictability of the 
model including the indicator against a benchmark model, and strongly reject the hypothesis 
of no out-of-sample predictability from the newly created indicator to GDP growth. We also 
provide evidence in favor of highly improved in-sample fit when the new indicator is 
included, and conclude that it Granger-causes GDP growth. The improvement in GDP 
growth forecasts is greater when an oil price measure is included in the models. 
The second paper employs a probit model for the US to describe the probability of an 
economic recession during the next five quarters, using the new indicator based on the 
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correlation of residential and non-residential marginal product of capital. We find that in 
every one to three quarters prior to a recession, the correlation of the two series is not 
significantly different from zero, with the exception of the Great Recession. We show that 
models including the new measure improve both in-sample fit and out-of-sample 
performance when compared to nested baseline alternatives, giving accurate out-of-sample 
forecasts for the 1990-1991 recession. We also show that forecasts including the new 
indicator outperform those reported in the survey of professional forecasters, suggesting that 
other variables would not undo the contribution of the new indicator.  
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Chapter One 
Marginal Product of Capital, the Business Cycle, and Forecasting 
Economic Growth 
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1.1 Introduction 
Forecasting GDP growth plays an important role for the present and future state of the 
economy. A more precise prediction of the health of economic activity will reduce the cost 
associated with late or inaccurate forecasts and strengthen the pulse of the economy. A better 
performing forecast allows the policymakers to judge the right amount of “medicine” needed 
to heal the US economy more quickly. The credibility of the policymaker is strengthened 
when decisions are based on better information of the economy’s health. Thus, better forecast 
performance will lead to better decisions. 
Our analysis focuses on improving the predictability of real GDP growth forecasts. 
To this end, we create a new indicator based on the correlation of residential and non-
residential marginal product of capital (MPK) and test how well models including the new 
indicator perform in-sample and out-of-sample compared to nested baseline models. To our 
knowledge, the newly created indicator is original to this paper. 
There is a vast literature on the prediction of GDP growth using a multitude of 
methods to determine predictive ability. One strain of literature has examined numerous 
contemporaneous and leading indicators that improve forecasts of the business cycle. Short-
term interest rates attracted considerable attention in predicting output changes, beginning 
with the influential study of Sims (1980), who found that that upward innovation in interest 
rates were followed by a decline in GDP growth with a two-quarter lag, and later confirmed 
by Bernanke and Blinder (1992). Yield spreads between short-term and long-term interest 
rates were effective enough in predicting economic activity to be included in the index of 
leading economic indicators created by Stock and Watson (1989), and also the inverted yield 
curve was found to be a good indicator of recessions by Estrella and Mishkin (1998). 
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Hamilton and Lin (1996) and Taylor (1999) asses the importance of asset prices and asset 
price volatility on GDP growth. Finally, the study of oil shocks can also help to predict 
economic slowdowns as shown in the seminal paper of Hamilton (1983), where he finds that 
a large increase in crude oil prices generally preceded US recessions until the beginning of 
the 1980s.1 
Using a novel measure based on the correlation of the marginal product of capital 
(MPK) between residential and non-residential sectors, we attempt to improve existing 
forecasts of real output growth.2 We create an indicator based on a pattern observed through 
the business cycle: negative correlation of the series during recessions, weak positive 
correlation during recoveries, positive during expansions, and close to zero between one and 
three quarters before the following recession. This indicator is largely driven by residential 
investment being much more interest rate sensitive and less income sensitive than non-
residential investment. The correlation changes in a predictable way because of fluctuations 
in income and real interest rates. We then test our proposed models’ performance both in-
sample and out-of-sample against their nested baseline alternatives.   
The correlation between residential and non-residential MPK is strongly negative in a 
recession. Leading up to a recession, interest rates are relatively high and generally 
increasing. Looking at the non-residential and residential sectors, the responses to interest 
rate changes are different, and so are the marginal products of capital. Non-residential capital 
is not terribly sensitive to the interest rate variation, and does not see major changes from 
                                                            
1 For the following periods, Hamilton (1996, 2003) uses a nonlinear transformation of oil prices suggesting a 
strong relationship from oil to output growth. Nonetheless, Bernanke, Gertler, and Watson (1997), Edelstein 
and Kilian (2009), and Blanchard and Gali (2010), present a fading predictive content from oil to economic 
activity. Hamilton and Herrera (2004) show that Bernanke’s et. al (1997) results are not robust to the inclusion 
of longer lags. Hamilton (2009) uses several of Edelstein and Kilian’s (2009) models and discovers that energy 
prices explain a large fraction of the forecast errors. 
2 The two sectoral MPKs were first analyzed by Mulligan and Threinen (2010), utilizing a different framework. 
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expansion to recession. Non-residential income, however, falls considerably during a 
recession, causing non-residential MPK to fall as well. Residential MPK is much different. 
Residential income adjusts very slowly to market conditions, while, because housing is more 
interest rate sensitive, residential capital takes a much bigger hit, causing residential MPK to 
increase during recessions.  
In the recovery phase, following the end of the recession, the correlation between 
residential and non-residential capital switches from being highly negative to weakly 
negative and, shortly after, weakly positive. When the economy is weak, the Fed loosens 
monetary policy by decreasing interest rates in an attempt to stimulate the economy. This 
affects the MPK of each sector differently. Non-residential income increases quickly, while 
residential income remains sticky. Capital also reacts differently based on how sensitive 
investment in each sector is to the interest rate. Non-residential capital increases, but at a rate 
that is slower than non-residential income growth. Residential capital, on the other hand, 
shoots up at a rate that is faster than residential income growth.  
As the recovery matures, it evolves into an expansion where we observe a strong 
positive correlation between residential and non-residential MPK. Expansions are generally 
much longer and more stable than recoveries, thus, residential income is no longer sticky 
because it has enough time to adjust to current market conditions. Furthermore, when the 
economy is heating up, the Fed generally starts to run tighter monetary policy, increasing 
interest rates and depressing investment. Non-residential income and capital are both 
increasing during expansions and the effect on non-residential MPK is somewhat ambiguous. 
Over the entire recovery and expansion period, both residential and non-residential MPK are 
almost constant, with only short-term movement. As a result of the interest rate’s behavior, 
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between one and three quarters before most recessions, the correlation becomes essentially 
zero.   
There are two episodes that do not fit the observed pattern of correlations. First, the 
expansion of 2002-2007 is an anomaly, likely due to the global savings glut flowing to the 
US, providing firms with "cheap money", which led to overinvesting and a falling MPK. The 
second exception is the Great Recession, which has a very different pattern from the other 
post-war recessions, because it was not “caused” by the Fed in an attempt to fight inflation, 
but occurred as a consequence of the financial crisis. For these two episodes the correlation 
between residential and non-residential MPK never reaches zero. Our model has a high 
predictability of output growth for a typical business cycle, but does not work as well for 
financial crises.    
We perform forecasts of GDP growth using an indicator based on the correlation 
between residential and non-residential MPK as an explanatory variable. We add this new 
indicator to two well established models, an autoregressive model and an autoregressive 
model including lags of Hamilton's (2003) peak oil variable, and compare in-sample fit and 
out-of-sample predictability. We find moderate improvement over the autoregressive model 
for both metrics. When the new variable is added to the model including peak oil, the results 
are much stronger. This suggests that not only does our indicator improve forecasts of output 
growth, but it is also a complement rather than a substitute to the well established leading 
indicator peak oil.  
We use rolling and recursive regressions to forecast output growth starting in 1947:4, 
with 100 observations in each regression for the rolling specification, and a minimum of 100 
observations for the recursive specification. Keeping the number of observations constant 
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(rolling), or having an increasing number of observations (recursive), we report results 
beginning in 1973:4, through 2011:1.  
The most common econometric method of identifying a potentially useful predictor is 
to rely on in-sample significance tests such as comparison of the adjusted R-squared (Rഥଶ) and 
Granger causality tests. When we compare the proposed models to their nested baselines, we 
find that the Rഥଶ is always higher for our models than for the nested baseline models with the 
recursive framework, and generally higher for the rolling framework, except between 1987-
1997. Additionally, for both proposed models, the Granger causality on our indicator is 
usually significant, except during the 1990s, when it is insignificant for all models. 
The period 1987 to 2000 is generally considered a great success for monetary policy, 
considering that the Fed closely followed the Taylor rule. Due to this success, inflation was 
kept near its target, hence, there were rather small fluctuations in the real interest rate. The 
relatively stable real interest rate suggests that our model is unlikely to perform well during 
this time, or other times of exceptionally good monetary policy, because the correlation of 
the MPKs is largely driven by changes in the real interest rate.  
We report two out-of-sample test statistics which are appropriate for nested models: 
the DMW test of Diebold and Mariano (1995) and West (1996) with McCracken’s (2007) 
critical values and the CW test of Clark and West (2006). We test the model including our 
indicator against the nested baseline autoregressive model, and find that there is strong 
evidence in favor of our model through 1990:2 for both the rolling and recursive 
specifications. The rolling specification has mixed results from 1990:3 until 1997:2 when the 
evidence becomes strong again, and remains so for the rest of the sample. Similarly, the 
recursive specification also has mixed results until 1996:2, however it exhibits no evidence 
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from 1996:3 to 1998:2, then mixed evidence from 1998:3 until 2009:1, when the evidence 
finally becomes strong again, and remains so for the rest of the sample. When adding our 
indicator to the autoregressive and peak oil model, we always find strong evidence that our 
model outperforms the nested baseline alternative. 
In the following section, we construct the sectoral MPKs and analyze their trend. 
Next, we examine the post-war business cycles. We then present and discuss the in-sample 
results, that are both illustrative and useful in model selection. Lastly, we test for increased 
out-of-sample predictability, which constitutes the main focus of the paper, and report the 
out-of-sample results. Finally, we conclude on the usefulness of the new indicator. 
 
1.2 Marginal Product of Capital for the Residential and Non-Residential Sectors 
According to economic theory, the marginal product of capital (MPK) is as a good 
predictor of real economic activity (e.g., Feldstein and Summers (1977), Auerbach (1983)). 
We show that when analyzing business cycle conditions, the sectoral marginal product of 
capital can improve forecasts of GDP growth. We present the method of constructing 
quarterly marginal products and discuss their evolution during the representative sample 
periods, pointing out the commonalities and dissimilarities between them. 
1.2.1 Sectoral MPKs 
Consider the standard neoclassical model for a two-sector economy, residential and 
non-residential, featuring all of the standard assumptions of constant returns to scale and 
perfectly competitive domestic capital markets. The marginal product of capital equals the 
rental rate of capital for each of the two sectors. We assume a Cobb-Douglas production 
function given by: Y୲ୖ ൌ A୲ୖ K୲ୖ ஑౎L୲ୖ ଵି஑౎ for the residential sector, where 
R
tY is the total 
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income for the residential sector at time t, 
R
tA  is the Total Factor Productivity (TFP) at time 
t, K୲ୖ  represents residential capital and L୲ୖ  is the labor utilized for the residential sector. 
Similarly, the production function for the non-residential sector is: Y୲୒ୖ ൌ
A୲୒ୖK୲஑ొ౎L୲ଵି஑ొ౎, where Y୲୒ୖ is the income of the non-residential sector at time t, A୲୒ୖ is Total 
Factor Productivity at time t, K୲୒ୖ is non-residential capital, and L୲୒ୖ is the labor utilized for 
the non-residential sector. 
Following growth theory, it is easy to derive the value of sectoral MPKs: 
MPK୲ୖ ൌ αୖ,୲ ଢ଼౪
౎
୏౪౎  for the residential sector, and 
 MPK୲୒ୖ ൌ α୒ୖ,୲ ଢ଼౪ొ
౎
୏౪ొ ౎  for the non-residential sector.  
In a competitive market with constant returns to scale, the sectoral marginal product 
of capital is given by the income accruing for each sector divided by the amount of capital 
employed.  In calculating the sectoral marginal product of capital, we first start by describing 
each term in the order they are presented in the equations.  
We make several observations when calculating capital shares for the two sectors, 
and construct them by closely following methods presented in the literature, by backing out 
the capital share as 1 – labor share. For the residential sector, we assume that there is too 
little labor involved in owning and living in a house to affect the labor share, and as a result 
the labor share for the residential sector approaches zero, leaving the capital share, αୖ, 
trending to a value not significantly different than 1. For simplicity of calculation, we 
consider αୖ,୲ ൌ 1. For the non-residential sector, the labor share takes a value of one third.3 
                                                            
3 The results are robust when using Mulligan and Threinen’s (2010) measure of labor share. In this case, the 
capital share is:   α୒ୖ,୲ ൌ 1 െ େ୭୫୮ୣ୬ୱୟ୲୧୭୬ ୭୤ ୔୰୧୴ୟ୲ୣ ୗୣୡ୲୭୰ ୉୫୮୪୭୷ୣୣୱ౪୒ୟ୲୧୭୬ୟ୪ ୍୬ୡ୭୫ୣ౪ିେ୭୫୮ୣ୬ୱୟ୲୧୭୬ ୭୤ ୋ୭୴ୣ୰୬ୣ୫ୣ୬୲ ୉୫୮୪୭୷ୣୣୱ౪ି୔୰୭୮୰୧ୣ୲୭୰ୱᇱ୍୬ୡ୭୫ୣ౪ 
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The measure for residential income comes from the NIPA tables on Gross Value 
Added for Households and Institutions and comprises the rental of tenant-occupied non-farm 
housing and the imputed rental value of owner occupied nonfarm housing. The non-
residential income, called Gross Value Added of the Business Sector in the NIPA tables, is 
backed out from GDP – Residential Income and Gross Value Added of Government.  
The standard measure of the capital stock is calculated using the perpetual inventory 
method from residential and non-residential real investment flows, using a depreciation rate 
of 6% per year for the non-residential sector and 2% for the residential sector.4 Following 
standard practice, we compute the initial value of the capital stock for the residential sector as 
K଴ୖ ൌ ୍బ
౎
ሺ୥౎ାδሻ, where I଴ୖ  is the value of residential investment for the first year of available data 
(1948:1), where gୖ is the average of the geometric mean growth rate between the first year of 
data available and last year.5 In the same manner, the initial value of the capital stock for the 
non-residential sector is K଴୒ୖ ൌ ୍బొ
౎
ሺ୥ొ౎ାδሻ, with I଴
୒ୖ representing the initial value of the non-
residential investment, where g୒ୖ represents the geometric mean growth for non-residential 
investment for the whole sample.6 We follow the same practice for the residential sector. The 
next step involves constructing each period’s “t” residential and non-residential capital: 
K୲୧ ൌ  K୲ିଵ୧ ൅ ሺ1 െ δሻI୲୧, where i = {residential, non-residential}.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
 
4 These are the values most commonly used in the literature. When we perform robustness checks, results do not 
change for values of 10% for non-residential and 5% residential. 
5 Also from NIPA tables and comprises construction put in place, single-family housing starts, sales of new 
homes and sales of existing homes. 
6 Unit auto and truck sales, construction put in place, manufacturers’ shipments of machinery and equipment 
other than aircraft, shipments of civilian aircraft, exports and imports of machinery and equipment. 
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1.2.2 Trends and Features 
Figure 1.1 shows the evolution of both series over time, created as described above. 
Over the whole sample period, 1948:1 to 2009:4, the trend of the residential MPK is rising, 
while non-residential MPK is declining over time. The convergence toward the same value 
(5.3%) is satisfactory from the growth theory perspective. One would expect that, if properly 
calculated, the MPKs would converge to the same value over time. It is surprising that it took 
so long for the two series to come closer together and even more unanticipated that it 
happened toward the end of the Great Recession.  
On average, the marginal product of residential capital for the whole sample is 4.4% 
and 8.9% for the non-residential. There are multiple reasons why these values are not equal 
to each other. For one, we can think that the differences may arise from a risk premium. If 
the public receives information that the housing sector could be affected, the risk-premium 
increases, the capital for the housing sector will decrease, and investors will reallocate their 
money to the non-residential sector, which implies a higher value of MPK for the non-
residential sector. Another reason stems from the fact that flows of capital do not account for 
land values or for the price of capital, both of which have been shown to reduce these 
differences.7 Mismeasurement in constructing the capital estimates in the two sectors could 
also be erroneous.8 Indirect taxes and income taxes make marginal product of non-residential 
capital higher than marginal product of residential capital, as discussed in Mulligan and 
Threinen (2010). Rented homes, new homes, and imputed services for owner occupied 
housing are not subject to any of the taxes mentioned previously. 
                                                            
7 Caselli and Feyrer (2007) show that financial markets allocate capital efficiently if we distinguish between  the 
prices of capital goods versus consumption  goods 
8 Griliches (1981) shows that we exclude intangible capital from capital stock measure. 
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For a more clear understanding of the evolution, we graph the residential MPK on the 
left axis and non-residential MPK on the left axis with grey shades representing the NBER 
recession dates, as shown in Figure 1.2. It is visible in the graph that during expansions, the 
MPKs have a tendency to move away from each other. When “good times” occur, the 
economy is booming and the residential and non-residential income is also intensifying, 
explaining the upward trend and the positive correlation of the two series. During “bad 
times”, the economic activity experiences a slowdown, putting downward pressure on the 
interest rates, which will affect the residential sector more quickly than the non-residential 
sector. As a consequence, the non-residential MPK declines while residential MPK stagnates 
or even increases. It is not surprising in these circumstances that the two MPKs are 
negatively correlated. The correlation of the two series is negative (-0.75).  Around 1969, 
there is a switch in the evolution of the series, when non-residential MPK started to go down 
and residential MPK went up, with the switch completed around 1980. The residential MPK 
series has a smoother appearance, while non-residential MPK is more volatile by nature. This 
was highly expected considering the nature of the capital involved and the duration of 
repaying the initial investment. Between 1970:1 and 1980:1, both series fluctuate slightly 
around their trend, keeping an almost constant value of 4.27% in the case of residential MPK 
and an exactly double value of 9.45% for non-residential MPK. Throughout the same period, 
the correlation of the series was still negative (-29.2%), but significantly lower than for the 
whole interval. The time before 1970:1 was characterized by a positive correlation of 40.4%, 
but this could be erroneously calculated and interpreted considering the flaws in the perpetual 
inventory method regarding the initial value of capital. However, the period after 1980:1, 
displays negative correlation of -42.16%, which is consistent with the finding for the whole 
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sample. Visually, one might think that recessions are associated with slowdowns in non-
residential investment and non-residential MPK lower at the troughs, and expansions with 
recoveries in residential investment, higher residential MPK at the peak.  
Figure 1.3 depicts the evolution over time of the growth rates of residential and non-
residential MPK. The most striking feature of the growth rates is the noticeable divergence 
during most recessions, with residential MPK growth moving very slowly down, and non-
residential declining very abruptly. This behavior is explained by the evolution of capital and 
income for each sector. Residential income is sticky, especially in recessions which are short, 
so the movement in residential MPK comes from decreased residential investment during a 
recession. Recessions generally begin because the Fed induces them, in order to fight 
inflation, by raising the interest rate. Residential investment is highly sensitive to the interest 
rate partially because it is generally made using long-term collateralized loans. Thus, during 
a recession, the residential MPK generally increases. Non-residential MPK on the other hand 
is much more volatile. Non-residential income is not sticky, and decreases rapidly during a 
recession, pushing the non-residential MPK down. Non-residential investment also falls, 
pushing the MPK up, but generally not by as much as income.  
There is strong evidence that the Great Recession was different. Residential 
investment dropped to its lowest value in 30 years. Part of the decline in residential 
investment is almost certainly due to the credit crunch that accompanied the Great Recession. 
Banks were hesitant to lend in a time of such turmoil, due to rising costs from having a "risk 
premium" on all new investments; this is consistent with the increasing MPK. Non-
residential investment is likely to follow the same pattern, although the likelihood of the 
credit crunch affecting investment is much lower than in the residential sector. This is 
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because labor is complimentary to non-residential capital. Thus, as labor decreases with the 
crisis, the demand for non-residential capital also decreases, leading to falling investment, 
and an increasing MPK. 
 
1.3 Zero correlation measure and economic activity 
Forecasting the growth of output is of great interest to policymakers and market 
participant, and any way to improve our ability to do better is an important contribution to 
the literature. Therefore, we suggest a new variable for forecasting real GDP growth and test 
it against a variety of more restricted models, including the results of previously successful 
forecasting models. 
1.3.1 The correlation indicator 
The variable proposed in this study is constructed based on the correlation of MPK for 
residential and non-residential sectors, based on the pattern observed for the business cycle. 
First, there are some necessary annotations about the way correlations were calculated. For 
each recession and following expansion, we will be calculating the correlation for that 
sample period after the rule: for the beginning of any recession, specifically, for the first 
three quarters the correlation will include the past four previous observations, and from 
quarter four onward, we exclusively pick only the previous observation of that particular 
recession. As an example, if we calculate the correlation for MPK residential and non-
residential for the beginning of 1960 recession (1960:2), it will include three of the 
observations from the previous expansion: 1959:03, 1959:04, 1960:01 and the first 
observation of the recession, 1960:2. The four-quarter rule is compulsory, because of 
statistical properties of correlation. A correlation with less than three observations would be 
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meaningless, and exactly three tends to give no useful information, beside the direction of the 
relationship between two variables. Hence, four observations is the minimum number that 
could be selected. We apply exactly the same logic for the expansions, and of course, in this 
case we register a higher number of correlation values, based on the fact that expansions are 
approximately six times longer than recessions. As a last observation, we would like to 
emphasis the importance of the last one and three correlations from an expansion, calculated 
with all the previous values recorded for that expansion.  
In the data, between one to three quarters before the onset of a recession, the above-
mentioned correlation takes values close to zero. These are not are not the only times when 
the correlation takes very low values, however there are a few scarce appearances at the 
beginning of 1990s. Our indicator consists in creating a dummy variable, ZEROCORR, that 
takes value one if the correlation is less than 7%, and zero otherwise.  
Our proposed indicator performs better than the unaltered correlation because it 
focuses solely on predicting turning points. The result of forecasting GDP is a continuing 
trend, and to obtain a better forecast we need to be able to predict the actual switch from peak 
to through. Therefore, our indicator improves the forecast of economic activity when the 
economy is entering a recession. Our indicator is very similar to Hamilton’s (2003) nonlinear 
transformation called oil price shock, with the only difference that the latter takes the 
maximum value of the previous three years window and zero for the rest. 
1.3.2 Forecasting Models 
 We study four regression models with the purpose of analyzing the predictive content 
of zero correlation measure in various models for future GDP growth. We explore how 
sensitive the results are for both recursive and rolling windows. We analyze the predictive 
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content up to 16 quarters. The finding of this exercise is that the zero correlation measure has 
important predictive content for real activity. 
 Because current and lagged rates of GDP growth may be useful for forecasting GDP, 
the first model used is a simple AR(4) specification, which will be the baseline specification 
for comparing forecasts. The lag order for the estimated model is set to four, following 
Hamilton (2003).9 Specifically, consider regressing each quarter of GDP growth ( ty ) on a 
constant and four lags of GDP growth. The regression equation is: 
k
ty ൌ α ൅෍β୧ ity  ൅
ସ
୧ୀଵ
ε୲                  ሺ Model 1ሻ 
where ݇  ସ଴଴௞ ሺln ሺ ௧ܻା௞ሻ െ lnሺ ௧ܻሻሻ is annualized quarterly GDP growth at time t with ௧ܻା௞ real 
GDP in quarter ݐ ൅ ݇, and ߝ௧ is the error term, ߝ௧~ܰሺ0,1ሻ. As expected, the estimates of the 
autoregressive model indicate that past values of GDP growth help predict future GDP 
growth, but for a very short horizon. Model 1 is the nested model and serves as the 
benchmark for making comparisons with all the other models. 
 The second model builds on the first by including four lags of Hamilton's (2003) 
nonlinear oil shock measure. There is a vast and very influential literature on the benefits of 
including oil prices to forecast economic activity. Hamilton (1983) documented and 
exploited the significant negative relationship between oil price changes and future GDP 
growth. He documented the quarterly symmetric oil price changes significantly affecting the 
quarterly growth rate from 1948:2 – 1980:3. A symmetric relationship implies a growth spurt 
with the decline of oil prices. This explanation suffers from omitted variables, but works 
fairly well before 1986 due to positive oil price changes. However, the effect can also be 
                                                            
9 Cochrane (2005) mentions that a few extra lags were added to make sure when identifying the lag order for 
time series models. 
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asymmetric, and as a result, a dramatic increase in oil prices might be followed by slow 
future growth. As a result, Hamilton’s (1983) specification is appropriate until 1986, but 
flawed after as a cause of the increased nonlinearity induced by large negative oil price 
movements. This issue was fixed in Hamilton’s (2003) paper, using a transformation of the 
raw oil price. The new measure of the transformed oil price shock exhibits a stable, negative 
relationship with future GDP growth.10 
 We are not interested in confirming this fact, but rather, we take it as given and use 
the peak oil model as a second baseline model. The model is a regression of each quarter’s 
GDP growth (ݕ௧) on a constant, four lags of GDP growth and four lags of the net increase in 
oil prices (OIL୲ି୧). The regression equation for the peak oil model is described as a linear 
regression model, even though the transformation of oil price changes is non-linear: 
k
ty ൌ α ൅෍β୧ ity  ൅෍γ୧
ସ
୧ୀଵ
OIL୲ି୧ ൅
ସ
୧ୀଵ
ε୲                  ሺ Model 2ሻ 
where OIL୲ is the net percentage increase in oil prices over the previous twelve quarters if 
positive, and zero otherwise. In other words, to account for asymmetric effects of oil prices, 
the positive changes for the definition of an oil shock are used as follows: 
OIL୲ ൌ ൜o୲       if ሼo୲ െ max ሺo୲ିଵ, o୲ିଶ, … , o୲ିଵଶሻሽ ൐ 00        if ሼo୲ െ max ሺo୲ିଵ, o୲ିଶ, … , o୲ିଵଶሻሽ ൑ 0 
where o୲ is the natural log of the oil price given by the producer's price index (PPI). This 
nonlinear transformation restored the true relationship between oil and GDP growth for the 
complete chosen sample, avoiding a spurious forecast of a non-existent GDP growth increase 
when oil prices decline. Hamilton (2003) found the coefficient on the fourth oil lag to be 
negative and significant at the 1% level. 
                                                            
10 An oil shock is equal to the difference between the current oil price and the maximum price in the past 4 or 12 
quarters if the difference is positive and is equal to zero otherwise 
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 The third model, once again builds on the baseline autoregressive model, and takes 
advantage of the new zero correlation variable. The regression equation for the zero 
correlation model is regressing each quarter of GDP growth (ݕ௧) on a constant, four lags of 
GDP growth and four lags of the zero correlation measure (ZEROCORR୲ି୧): 
k
ty ൌ α ൅෍β୧ ity  ൅෍λ୧
ସ
୧ୀଵ
ZEROCORR୲ି୧ ൅
ସ
୧ୀଵ
ε୲                                   ሺ Model 3ሻ 
We compare this model (Model 3) with the autoregressive model (Model 1) to see which fits 
the data better and which model better forecasts GDP growth. The univariate model provides 
just a benchmark for our analysis, allowing for the evaluation of whether the newly 
integrated indicator explains changes in economic activity and improves the fit for the 
nesting models. 
 The final model that we consider is a model with both Hamilton's peak oil measure 
(2003), and the zero correlation measure created in this paper. We are interested in showing 
that the inclusion of the zero correlation measure can improve the predictability of GDP 
growth over the oil model or the autocorrelation model. We proceed by regressing each 
quarter’s GDP growth ( ty ) on a constant, four lags of GDP growth, four lags of the net 
increase in oil prices (OIL୲ି୧), and four lags of the zero correlation measure (ZEROCORR୲ି୧). 
The regression equation for model with zero correlation and the oil model measure included 
is then: 
k
ty ൌ α ൅෍β୧ ity  ൅෍γ୧
ସ
୧ୀଵ
OIL୲ି୧ ൅෍λ୧
ସ
୧ୀଵ
ZEROCORR୲ି୧ ൅
ସ
୧ୀଵ
ε୲                       ሺModel 4ሻ 
Figure 1.4 plots oil and ZEROCORR on the same graph. 
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 In order to see if our indicator truly helps explain the variation in GDP growth, we 
need to have a statistically significant negative coefficient on at least one of the lags of 
ZEROCORR. The criterion is met for Model 4, the one-quarter ahead recursive regression, 
with the coefficient on ZEROCORR୲ିଶ negative and significant until 1990 and 
ZEROCORR୲ିଷ negative and significant (almost all the time) from 1990 to the end of the 
sample. The only drawback is that the significance is generally only at the 10% level. In 
contrast, the Model 3 one-quarter ahead recursive regression only satisfies this condition 
between 1982 and 1990, still at the 10% level. It is important to note that the coefficients 
change over the sample and the fit or Rഥଶ also varies notably, so it is necessary to analyze the 
indicator using a rolling specification.  
 The one-quarter ahead results for Model 4 are not as strong as the recursive in this 
case, with ZEROCORR୲ିଶ being negative and significant at the 10% level (almost always) 
until 1986, and then loses its significance between 1986 and 1998, after which 
ZEROCORR୲ିଷ becomes significant at the 1% level and keeps the significance through the 
end of the sample period. Model 3, once again performs not desirable, especially at the end 
of the sample, where ZEROCORR୲ିଷ is negative and significant at the 1% level through 1991 
and at the 10% level through 1996. Afterwards, it becomes insignificant for the remainder of 
the sample. The only other place a negative significant coefficient is found is ZEROCORR୲ିଶ 
from about 1975 to 1978, generally at the 10% level. As a final observation, ZEROCORR୲ିଵ 
is rarely significant, which seems to suggest that this is a leading indicator, even with data lag 
times factored in. Tables 1.1 and 1.2 summarize the results for Model 4. 
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1.3.3 In-sample predictive content 
We examine the in-sample predictive content of the zero correlation measure between 
the residential and non-residential MPK. The sample period of our analysis begins in 1947:1 
and extends to 2011:1 using exclusively calculated data according to the specification from 
Section 2. Data for economic activity is represented by quarterly GDP growth rates from the 
St. Louis FRED database, and the measure for oil is calculated using Hamilton’s (1998, 
2003) methodology. To evaluate in-sample fit, we use the adjusted R-squared ( തܴଶ), where 
higher values are preferred. We check the value of തܴଶ for each of the models using two types 
of regressions, rolling (Table 1.3) and recursive (Table 1.4). The rolling regressions utilize a 
fixed window to set the coefficients used to build the forecast. In this case the window is 25 
years, meaning that each time the regression moves forward by one quarter, one quarter is 
trimmed off from the beginning of the sample. The recursive regression, on the other hand, 
has an expanding window. The first recursive window is 25 years (the first forecast is the 
same for both the rolling and recursive regressions) and then one observation at a time is 
added to the end of the sample, increasing the sample size. We report the തܴଶ separately for 
each regression type, but put all four models on one graph for ease of comparison, as 
depicted by Figures 1.5 and 1.6. The തܴଶ is generally higher for models with zero correlation, 
with the exception of a period in the mid 1980s to the mid 1990s, and again after 2006, for 
the rolling regression. The recursive regression തܴଶ is strictly higher for the models including 
zero correlation as compared with the baseline models.   
1.3.4 Granger Causality  
Previous studies have scrutinized Granger causality among oil measures and GDP 
growth. Hamilton (1983) showed that US recessions are systematically preceded by large 
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crude oil price boosts and, consequently, the crude oil price Granger-causes real output on 
the sample ending in 1980.11 Hooker (1996) criticized the linear time-series approach 
previously described, due to the fact that oil prices no longer Granger-cause real output. In 
response, Hamilton (1996, 1998) created a new nonlinear transformation of oil prices, which 
sustains the initial result on Granger causality even when more recent data are included.
 Granger causality tests prove useful when OLS fails to determine the direction of the 
relationship between oil and the zero correlation measure with GDP. The argument made is 
that if the two measures lead to changes in output growth, we can rule out the possibility of 
real output changes causing the oil and zero correlation changes. The test is set to estimate 
the regressions for Model 3 and Model 4 both including and excluding the zero correlation 
measure as an explanatory variable. The causal association between the zero correlation 
measure and output is verified by Model 3 and Model 4 better explaining GDP growth 
relative to Model 1, Model 2 respectively. Both Model 3 and 4 Granger cause real GDP 
growth. 
We start by testing the hypothesis that the zero correlation measure helps forecast 
GDP. The null hypothesis in this case states that all coefficients on the zero correlation 
measure equal zero; if we reject the null, then the unrestricted Model 3 is reduced to the 
restricted Model 1 and ZEROCORR୲ Granger causes ݕ௧. In addition, the unrestricted Model 4 
reduces to Model 2, with ZEROCORR୲ and OIL୲ is Granger causing ݕ௧. All usual OLS t-
statistics and F-tests on the regression estimates are valid when drawing the conclusions. A 
more formal way to write this is: 
H଴: λ୧ ൌ 0 for all iሼ1,2,3,4ሽ 
                                                            
11 The positive correlation between an oil price increase and US recessions was noticeable after the OAPEC 
embargo, the Iranian revolution in 1978, and the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war in 1980. 
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Hଵ: At least 1 λ୧  ് 0 
We perform Granger causality tests for both models containing the ZEROCORR 
variable and both regression types. The p-values of the F-test are provided on the graph, so it 
is clearly visible when ZEROCORR Granger causes real GDP growth. For the rolling 
window, comparing Model 3 with Model 1, the null hypothesis is generally rejected, often at 
the 1% level, with the exceptions of 1989-1997 and 2001-2003, where the p-value spikes, 
causing a failure to reject the null. Comparing Model 4 with Model 2 yields similar results, 
except at the beginning of the sample, where we can only reject the null hypothesis at the 
10% level, and from 1983-1997, where we fail to reject the null. From 1998 on, the rejection 
is at least at the 5% level, and generally at the 1% level. The recursive regression does not 
change these basic results much. When comparing Model 4 with Model 2, we reject the null 
at the 1% level until 1990, after which there is a sharp increase in the p-value, which does not 
return to acceptable levels for the remainder of the sample. Figures 1.7 and 1.8 plot the p-
values for these results. Model 3 fares much better then Model 1, and is significant at the 5% 
level at the beginning of the sample, with the p-value spiking up again around 1990; 
however, this time it returns to 10% significance around 2002. The results are presented in 
Figures 1.9 and 1.10. This is discouraging, of course, but not unexpected given the results 
from the rolling regressions and the Rഥଶ results. It seems that ZEROCORR struggles to 
explain GDP growth in the 1980s and 1990s, and this trouble persists in the recursive 
regressions because of the expanding window, though it is removed in the rolling window 
regressions.   
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1.4 Out-of-Sample predictability 
When making forecasts, it is important to compare the out-of-sample predictability.  
It is often the case that a model may provide excellent in-sample fit (high തܴଶ and low p-
values for Granger causality leading to rejection of the null hypothesis), but this does not 
guarantee significant out-of-sample predictability, leading to a dreadful forecast.12 The in-
sample forecasts always present the danger of spurious predictability, with out-of-sample 
forecasts becoming imperative for the accuracy of a prediction. The model of interest for our 
investigation, for which we use oil shock and the zero correlation measure, is quite the 
opposite. There are some issues with the Granger causality, but the out-of-sample 
predictability is significantly better than for the alternative models.   
We now look at the out-of-sample forecast accuracy of one-quarter-ahead output 
growth for the Models 1 to 4 defined in the previous sections. An out-of-sample comparison 
involves estimating the model parameters for a predetermined subsample, and using them in 
the forecasting equation for the latter part of the sample. The forecasts and actual data are 
presented for both rolling and recursive regression in Figures 1.11 to 1.18. The forecasts are 
made over the period from 1973:1 to 2011:1, but the comparative predictive accuracy of the 
forecasts is presented over a more recent period of 1985:1 to 2011:2 using competing 
methodologies, well-established in the literature.  
To examine the predictive power of the zero correlation measure and oil shocks for 
real output growth, we use evaluation statistics for point estimates, previously proposed in 
the literature. We compare the point forecasts in terms of mean square prediction errors 
(MSPEs) for Model 4 versus Model 2, and Model 3 versus Model 1 for different out-of-
sample periods. Under the null hypothesis that the parsimonious benchmark (Model 1 and 2) 
                                                            
12 For more information, see Granger (1990). 
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is the true data generating process (DGP), the use of estimated non-benchmark models 
(Models 3 and 4) that nest the benchmark induces noise for the out-of-sample forecasts. The 
Clark and West MSPE, which we will discuss later, is an attempt to reduce the noise when 
making forecast comparison for nested models. 
Testing if the output growth is equally linearly predictable with nested and non-nested 
models requires, as a first check, a comparison of the mean square prediction error (MSPE) 
for each model. The model with a lower than one ratio of MSPE, is said to have a better out-
of-sample predictability. The ideal case would be for the unrestricted model to outperform 
the restricted model. 
To test the out-of-sample predictability, we use two tests. First, we use the DMW test, 
introduced by Diebold and Mariano (1995) and West (1996), and CW test, introduced by 
Clark and West (2006).  The CW test is actually an adjustment to the DMW test, making it 
applicable to nested models. Since we are comparing nested models, the DMW test using 
standard critical values is inappropriate, therefore, we will use the appropriate asymptotic 
critical values as explained in McCracken (2007). These considerations are central in 
forecasting GDP growth, because Model 1 is nested in Model 3, and Model 2 in Model 4. It 
is important to note that for both tests of out-of-sample predictability, one-quarter-ahead 
forecasts are used, and both are based on the mean squared prediction error (MSPE).   
For the DMW test, we test the null hypothesis that the nested baseline model, without 
the zero correlation measure, has the lower MSPE: 
H଴:MSPEଵ െ MSPEଶ ൌ 0 
Hଵ:MSPEଵ െ MSPEଶ ൐ 0 
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where forecasting equation 1 is the nested forecast and equation 2 is the nesting forecast. For 
example, consider Model 1 and Model 3 from above: 
Model 1:  y୲ ൌ α ൅෍β୧y୲ି୧ ൅
ସ
୧ୀଵ
ε୲ 
Model 3:    y୲ ൌ α ൅෍β୧y୲ି୧ ൅෍λ୧
ସ
୧ୀଵ
ZEROCORR୲ି୧ ൅
ସ
୧ୀଵ
ε୲, 
and  
MSPE ൌ   ሺy୲ െ FORECAST୲ሻ
ଶ
P  
Model 1 is nested in Model 3, so we compare whether the MSPE of Model 1 is 
greater than the MSPE of Model 3, or not. This is a one sided test, because if the MSPE of 
Model 3 is greater than or equal to MSPE of Model 1, then Model 1 is preferred.   
Likewise, Model 2 is nested in Model 4: 
Model 2:    y୲ ൌ α ൅෍β୧y୲ି୧ ൅෍γ୧
ସ
୧ୀଵ
OIL୲ି୧ ൅
ସ
୧ୀଵ
ε୲ 
Model 4:    y୲ ൌ α ൅෍β୧y୲ି୧ ൅෍γ୧
ସ
୧ୀଵ
OIL୲ି୧ ൅෍λ୧
ସ
୧ୀଵ
ZEROCORR୲ି୧ ൅
ସ
୧ୀଵ
ε୲ 
Thus, we compare whether the MSPE of Model 2 is greater than the MSPE of Model 
4, following the steps outlined above. 
To get the test statistic for the DMW test, the first step is to construct a series of the 
squared prediction error differential as follows: 
fመୈ୑୛ ൌ ሺy୲ െ RESTRICTFOR୲ሻଶ െ ሺy୲ െ UNRESTRICTFOR୲ሻଶ. 
Then, we regress fመୈ୑୛ on a constant, and the t-statistic on the constant is the DMW 
test statistic, which is also known as MSE-t. When comparing nested models, such as those 
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we examine in this study, using the standard normal critical values causes the DMW test to 
be severely undersized, to correct for this we use McCracken (2007)’s critical values. We 
perform the DMW test for both rolling and recursive forecasting regressions, comparing 
Model 3 to Model 1, and Model 4 to Model 2. The results are presented in Table 1.5. The 
rolling regression performs better than the recursive regression for both model comparisons. 
Model 4 is always superior to Model 2, and Model 3 is always superior in the rolling 
regression, but is insignificant for much of the later part of the sample. 
The Clark West statistic is very similar to the DMW statistic, but makes an 
adjustment to the MSPE in order to achieve proper size when the restricted forecast is nested. 
For the CW test, the hypotheses are: 
H଴:MSPEଵ െ ሺMSPEଶ െ  adjustmentሻ ൌ 0 
Hଵ:MSPEଵ െ ሺMSPEଶ െ  adjustmentሻ ൐ 0 
Much like the DMW test, the first step in getting the test statistic involves 
constructing a series of the squared prediction error differential adjusted 
fመେ୛ ൌ ሺy୲ െ RESTRICTFOR୲ሻଶ
െ ሺሺy୲ െ UNRESTRICTFOR୲ሻଶ െ ሺRESTRICTFOR୲ െ UNRESTRICTFOR୲ሻଶሻ. 
We then regress fመେ୛ on a constant and the test statistic is the t-stat on the constant. 
The CW test has already been adjusted, so standard asymptotic critical values for the t 
distribution are applicable.  
As with the DMW test, we perform the CW test for both rolling and recursive 
regressions, and for both Model 3 versus Model 1, and Model 4 versus Model 2. The results, 
reported in Table 1.5, are quite similar to the DMW test, where Model 4 is always preferred 
to Model 2, for both rolling and recursive regressions. The results on Model 3 versus Model 
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1 are not nearly as strong, the majority of the time Model 3 is preferred (rejection of the null), 
but from 1990:4 to 1998:3 Model 1 is preferred (failure to reject the null) for both rolling and 
recursive regressions.  
Another important way of comparing forecasts is to use the ratio of MSPEs, where 
MSPE୳୬୰ୣୱ୲୰୧ୡ୲ୣୢ MSPE୰ୣୱ୲୰୧ୡ୲ୣୢ⁄  should be less than one. For the rolling regressions, one 
quarter ahead, this is always the case Model 3 versus Model 1 approaches, but never reaches 
or exceeds one. The one-quarter-ahead recursive regressions do not do quite as well, with 
Model 3 versus Model 1 occasionally exceeding one, and a value very close to or equal to 
one from 1991 onward. Model 4 vs. Model 2 fares better, once again, never equaling or 
exceeding one, but approaching one very closely. The ratio of MSPEs is shown in Figures 
1.19 to 1.22. Comparing Model 4 to Model 2, using the rolling regression, it is quite evident 
that the MSPE for Model 4 is smaller than that of Model 2 with a ratio of only 0.934 
throughout the entire sample, but does not perform nearly as well under a recursive 
framework with a MSPE of 0.996. Model 3 does not perform nearly as well against Model 1 
when the entire sample is considered, with a value of 0.993 for the rolling regression and 
0.999 for recursive. Selected results are presented in Table 1.6. 
 
1.5 Conclusions 
We have constructed a new indicator of economic activity involving the correlation 
between residential and non-residential marginal product of capital and demonstated its 
usefulness in economic forecasting. The in-sample fit and out-of-sample performance of 
standard forecasting models are improved by the inclusion of our indicator. To examine in-
sample fit we perform Granger causality tests and compare the adjusted R-squared. We test 
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out-of-sample predictability using the DMW test with McCracken critical values and the CW 
test, as well as examining the ratio of MSPEs. The in-sample fit shows more improvement in 
the recursive framework compared to the rolling framework, while out-of-sample 
performance exhibits the opposite trend, improving more in the rolling framework than in the 
recursive. 
The current empirical analysis leads to several important conclusions about the 
relationship between GDP growth and our indicator. First, the model’s explanatory power is 
visibly improved when including the zero correlation measure of the non-residential and 
residential sectors. Second, our indicator improves upon a strict autoregressive model. The 
evidence is much stronger for the model with both an autoregressive and oil component, 
where inclusion of our indicator always improves out-of-sample predictability. The increase 
in out-of-sample predictability is striking for the autoregressive model both, with both DMW 
and CW tests generally, but not always, significant. However, for the model also including 
oil, both the DMW and CW tests are always significant. 
Although a myriad of factors could be related to GDP growth, our indicator 
significantly improves forecasts of GDP growth, especially when Hamilton’s (2003) peak oil 
measure is also used. The complementarity between these two measures is remarkable, as 
many things could improve the GDP growth forecasts on their own, but most fail to add 
anything when well-established explanatory variables such as oil are used. Not only does our 
indicator not lose its significance when oil is included in the forecasting equation, but it is 
enhanced.   
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1.6 Figures and Tables 
Figure 1.1 Residential and Non-residential MPKs 
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Figure 1.2 Residential and Non-residential MPKs 
 
  Note: MPKR left axis, MPKNR right axis 
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Figure 1.3 MPK Residential and Non-residential Growth Rates 
 
  Note: GROWTH_MPKR left axis, GROWTH_MPKNR right axis 
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Figure 1.4 ZEROCORR and Oil with NBER Recession Dates 
 
  Notes: Zerocorr on left axis, Oil on right axis, NBER recession dates shaded 
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Figure 1.5 Adjusted R-squared for Rolling Regression 
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Figure 1.6 Adjusted R-Squared for Recursive Regression 
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Figure 1.7 Granger Causality Model 4 vs. Model 2 
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Figure 1.8 Granger Causality Model 4 vs. Model 2 Recursive 
 
 
 
 
  
P_VALUE SIG_LEVEL_10
1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006 2009
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
36 
 
Figure 1.9 Granger Causality Model 3 vs. Model 1 Rolling 
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Figure 1.10 Granger Causality Mdoel 3 vs. Model 1 Recursive 
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Figure 1.11 Actual and Annualized Quarterly Growth, Model 1 Rolling 
 
 Note: Predicted is one quarter ahead forecasts, based on a recursive regression, with an initial sample period of 25 years, of the equation:   
ݕ௧ ൌ ߙ ൅෍ߚ௜ ∗ ݕ௧ି௜ 
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Figure 1.12 Actual and Predicted Annualized Quarterly Growth, Model 2 Rolling 
 
 
 Note: Predicted is one quarter ahead forecasts, based on a recursive regression, with an initial sample period of 25 years, of the equation:   
ݕ௧ ൌ ߙ ൅෍ߚ௜ ∗ ݕ௧ି௜ 
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Figure 1.13 Actual and Predicted Annualized Quarterly Growth, Model 3 Rolling 
 
 Note: Predicted is one quarter ahead forecasts, based on a recursive regression, with an initial sample period of 25 years, of the equation:  
ݕ௧ ൌ ߙ ൅෍ߚ௜ ∗ ݕ௧ି௜ 
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Figure 1.14 Actual and Predicted Annualized Quarterly Growth, Model 4, Rolling 
 Note: Predicted is one quarter ahead forecasts, based on a recursive regression, with an initial sample period of 25 years, of the equation: 
ݕ௧ ൌ ߙ ൅෍ߚ௜ ∗ ݕ௧ି௜ 
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Figure 1.15 Actual and Predicted Annualized Quarterly Growth, Model 1 Recursive 
 
 Note: Predicted is one quarter ahead forecasts, based on a recursive regression, with an initial sample period of 25 years, of the equation:  
 
ݕ௧ ൌ ߙ ൅෍ߚ௜ ∗ ݕ௧ି௜ 
ସ
௜ୀଵ
൅ ߝ௧ 
  
ACTUAL PREDICTED
Year
A
n
n
u
a
l
i
z
e
d
 
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
C
h
a
n
g
e
1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006 2009
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
43 
 
Figure 1.16 Actual and Predicted Annualized Quarterly Growth, Model 2 Recursive 
 
 Note: Predicted is one quarter ahead forecasts, based on a recursive regression, with an initial sample period of 
  25 years, of the equation:  
ݕ௧ ൌ ߙ ൅෍ߚ௜ ∗ ݕ௧ି௜ 
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Figure 1.17 Actual and Predicted Annualized Quarterly Growth, Model 3 Recursive 
 
 
 Note: Predicted is one quarter ahead forecasts, based on a recursive regression, with an initial sample period of 25 years, of the equation: 
ݕ௧ ൌ ߙ ൅෍ߚ௜ ∗ ݕ௧ି௜ 
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Figure 1.18 Actual and Predicted Annualized Quarterly Growth, Model 4 Recursive. 
 
 Note: Predicted is one quarter ahead forecasts, based on a recursive regression, with an initial sample period of 25 years, of the equation: 
ݕ௧ ൌ ߙ ൅෍ߚ௜ ∗ ݕ௧ି௜ 
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Figure 1.19 Model 3 vs. Model 1 Rolling MSPE Ratio 
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Figure 1.20 Model 3 vs. Model 1 Recursive MSPE Ratio 
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Figure 1.21 Model 4 vs. Model 2 Rolling MSPE Ratio 
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Figure 1.22 Model 4 vs. Model 2 Recursive MSPE Ratio 
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Table 1.1 OLS Estimates of GDP growth (y), using lagged growth, lagged OIL, and lagged ZEROCORR 
 
Recursive regression always starting at 1947:4 
End 
Date k Constant y{1} y{2} y{3} y{4} OIL{1} OIL{2} OIL{3} OIL{4} 
1983:1 1 4.17*** 0.22*** 0.08 -0.13** -0.11* -0.12 -0.06 -0.1*** -0.18*** 
(0.551) (0.063) (0.074) (0.053) (0.063) (0.097) (0.083) (0.037) (0.041) 
2 2.80*** 1.01*** -0.80*** 0.51*** -0.36*** -0.05** -0.08*** -0.1*** -0.04 
(0.305) (0.043) (0.069) (0.089) (0.053) (0.023) (0.027) (0.023) (0.043) 
3 1.43*** 1.0*** -0.04 -0.59*** 0.27*** -0.07*** -0.08** -0.03 0.03 
(0.241) (0.055) (0.088) (0.079) (0.051) (0.020) (0.030) (0.021) (0.033) 
1991:2 1 4.22*** 0.22*** 0.1 -0.15*** -0.13** -0.16*** -0.07 -0.07** -0.18*** 
(0.452) (0.060) (0.074) (0.050) (0.057) (0.060) (0.045) (0.028) (0.039) 
2 2.80*** 1.02*** -0.80*** 0.48*** -0.35*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.09*** -0.04 
(0.270) (0.041) (0.063) (0.083) (0.049) (0.015) (0.023) (0.016) (0.042) 
3 1.4*** 1.02*** -0.06 -0.6*** 0.29*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.04*** 0.03 
(0.201) (0.056) (0.086) (0.080) (0.050) (0.018) (0.021) (0.013) (0.028) 
2002:1 1 3.77*** 0.24*** 0.12* -0.15*** -0.11** -0.12** -0.09** -0.06** -0.14*** 
(0.374) (0.056) (0.072) (0.046) (0.053) (0.060) (0.037) (0.028) (0.030) 
2 2.47*** 1.03*** -0.76*** 0.46*** -0.32*** -0.05*** -0.06** -0.07*** -0.04 
(0.235) (0.040) (0.058) (0.073) (0.046) (0.013) (0.023) (0.016) (0.024) 
3 1.3*** 1.02*** -0.03 -0.64*** 0.31*** -0.04** -0.05*** -0.03*** 0.01 
(0.170) (0.055) (0.081) (0.077) (0.051) (0.018) (0.018) (0.011) (0.019) 
2009:3 1 3.44*** 0.26*** 0.13* -0.14*** -0.08 -0.10** -0.07** -0.08** -0.13*** 
(0.354) (0.055) (0.069) (0.045) (0.054) (0.049) (0.035) (0.032) (0.026) 
2 2.25*** 1.05*** -0.77*** 0.46*** -0.30*** -0.05*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.03 
(0.233) (0.041) (0.056) (0.072) (0.048) (0.017) (0.021) (0.014) (0.021) 
3 1.16*** 1.04*** -0.04 -0.64*** 0.33*** -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.03*** 0.01 
    (0.159) (0.053) (0.078) (0.075) (0.050) (0.015) (0.015) (0.009) (0.016) 
  Note: The regression takes the form of ݕ௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ∑ ߚ௜ݕ௧ି௜ ൅ ∑ ߛ௜ସ௜ୀଵ ܱܫܮ௧ି௜ ൅ ∑ ߣ௜ସ௜ୀଵ ܼܧܴܱܥܱܴܴ௧ି௜ ൅ସ௜ୀଵ ߝ௧. 
  Significance is represented by *, **, and *** representing 10%, 5%, and 1% significance, respectively. 
  In Parentheses are the Newey and West (1987) heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors corrected with twelve lags. 
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Table 1.1 Continued OLS Estimates of GDP growth (y), using lagged growth, lagged OIL, and lagged ZEROCORR 
 
Recursive regression always starting at 1947:4 
End 
Date k 
ZERO 
CORR{1} 
ZERO 
CORR{2} 
ZERO 
CORR{3} 
ZERO 
CORR{4} 
1983:1 1 -0.05 -3.12* -3.29 3.3*** 
(1.589) (1.601) (2.603) (1.267) 
2 -2.07*** -1.81 1.93** -0.15 
(0.717) (1.735) (0.774) (1.066) 
3 -0.2 0.27 -0.02 1.33* 
(0.806) (0.630) (0.689) (0.724) 
1991:2 1 -0.07 -2.2 -3.34 2.46* 
(1.211) (1.397) (2.058) (1.370) 
2 -1.48* -1.75 1.06 -0.72 
(0.765) (1.389) (0.918) (0.911) 
3 -0.3 -0.06 -0.66 1.15*** 
(0.690) (0.518) (0.722) (0.562) 
2002:1 1 1.02 -1.57 -2.82* 2.39** 
(1.080) (1.082) (1.488) (1.149) 
2 -0.64 -1.46 1.2* -0.47 
(0.738) (1.041) (0.682) (0.662) 
3 -0.26 0.05 -0.37 0.88** 
(0.493) (0.399) (0.491) (0.413) 
2009:3 1 1.14 -1.49 -2.75* 2.52** 
(1.056) (1.055) (1.478) (1.148) 
2 -0.57 -1.45 1.31* -0.4 
(0.727) (1.044) (0.691) (0.658) 
3 -0.24 0.07 -0.35 0.96** 
    (0.491) (0.400) (0.496) (0.409) 
   Note: The regression takes the form of ݕ௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ∑ ߚ௜ݕ௧ି௜ ൅ ∑ ߛ௜ସ௜ୀଵ ܱܫܮ௧ି௜ ൅ ∑ ߣ௜ସ௜ୀଵ ܼܧܴܱܥܱܴܴ௧ି௜ ൅ସ௜ୀଵ ߝ௧. 
   Significance is represented by *, **, and *** representing 10%, 5%, and 1% significance, respectively. 
   In Parentheses are the Newey and West (1987) heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard  
   errors corrected with twelve lags. 
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Table 1.2 OLS Estimates of GDP growth (y), using lagged growth, lagged OIL, and lagged ZEROCORR 
 
Rolling regression always starting 25 years prior to the End Date 
End 
Date k Constant y{1} y{2} y{3} y{4} OIL{1} OIL{2} OIL{3} OIL{4} 
1983:1 1 4.554*** 0.112* 0.025 -0.093 -0.036 -0.09 -0.065 -0.106** -0.216*** 
(0.856) (0.058) (0.076) (0.062) (0.087) (0.081) (0.093) (0.051) (0.036) 
2 3.132*** 0.961*** -0.852*** 0.606*** -0.407*** -0.043** -0.103*** -0.116*** -0.025 
(0.525) (0.070) (0.068) (0.088) (0.049) (0.018) (0.032) (0.034) (0.048) 
3 1.594*** 0.91*** 0.028 -0.586*** 0.268*** -0.072*** -0.088*** -0.025 0.041 
(0.355) (0.058) (0.100) (0.103) (0.065) (0.020) (0.022) (0.016) (0.033) 
1991:2 1 4.143*** 0.091 0.046 -0.082 -0.033 -0.104*** -0.087* -0.072* -0.201*** 
(0.746) (0.072) (0.090) (0.064) (0.077) (0.037) (0.048) (0.037) (0.032) 
2 2.635*** 0.96*** -0.806*** 0.579*** -0.356*** -0.044*** -0.073*** -0.091*** -0.011 
(0.423) (0.067) (0.066) (0.105) (0.078) (0.013) (0.026) (0.030) (0.047) 
3 1.365*** 0.9*** 0.041 -0.534*** 0.24*** -0.056*** -0.058** -0.026*** 0.049** 
(0.284) (0.060) (0.124) (0.114) (0.070) (0.021) (0.025) (0.008) (0.025) 
2002:1 1 3.508*** 0.157 0.048 -0.047 -0.007 -0.109** -0.074* -0.062 -0.118*** 
(0.652) (0.098) (0.130) (0.078) (0.079) (0.053) (0.038) (0.056) (0.042) 
2 2.027*** 0.98*** -0.774*** 0.534*** -0.25*** -0.035* -0.051 -0.064** -0.006 
(0.313) (0.075) (0.101) (0.097) (0.084) (0.021) (0.037) (0.027) (0.024) 
3 1.208*** 0.911*** -0.01 -0.524*** 0.308*** -0.032 -0.034** -0.019** -0.009 
(0.275) (0.091) (0.120) (0.143) (0.096) (0.028) (0.017) (0.008) (0.015) 
2009:3 1 2.023*** 0.211** 0.296*** -0.138* 0.077 -0.071* -0.077* -0.037 -0.055** 
(0.204) (0.107) (0.077) (0.076) (0.072) (0.041) (0.041) (0.057) (0.025) 
2 1.309*** 1.102*** -0.701*** 0.35*** -0.117 -0.044 -0.028 -0.029** -0.027* 
(0.218) (0.078) (0.108) (0.121) (0.099) (0.027) (0.028) (0.012) (0.015) 
3 0.626*** 1.072*** 0.046 -0.871*** 0.57*** -0.018 -0.03* -0.023*** 0.007 
    (0.187) (0.103) (0.132) (0.100) (0.077) (0.020) (0.017) (0.004) (0.011) 
  Note: The regression takes the form of ݕ௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ∑ ߚ௜ݕ௧ି௜ ൅ ∑ ߛ௜ସ௜ୀଵ ܱܫܮ௧ି௜ ൅ ∑ ߣ௜ସ௜ୀଵ ܼܧܴܱܥܱܴܴ௧ି௜ ൅ସ௜ୀଵ ߝ௧. 
  Significance is represented by *, **, and *** representing 10%, 5%, and 1% significance, respectively. 
  In Parentheses are the Newey and West (1987) heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors  
  corrected with twelve lags. 
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Table 1.2 Continued OLS Estimates of GDP growth (y), using lagged growth, lagged OIL, and lagged ZEROCORR 
 
Rolling regression always starting 25 years prior to the End Date 
End 
Date k ZEROCORR{1} ZEROCORR{2} ZEROCORR{3} ZEROCORR{4} 
1983:1 1 -0.246 -3.226 -0.503 1.208 
(1.917) (1.962) (1.649) (1.181) 
2 -2.505*** -0.043 1.346 -1.443 
(0.696) (1.537) (0.819) (0.900) 
3 0.887* -0.088 -0.972 0.775 
(0.513) (0.535) (0.794) (0.676) 
1991:2 1 0.468 -1.138 -0.974 -0.191 
(1.463) (0.907) (1.427) (1.257) 
2 -1.240** 0.178 -0.073 -2.132** 
(0.539) (1.321) (0.746) (0.837) 
3 0.481 -0.605* -1.546** 0.55 
(0.662) (0.319) (0.741) (0.490) 
2002:1 1 2.055 -1.307 -2.093*** 0.353 
(1.537) (1.286) (0.608) (0.971) 
2 0.515 -1.897*** 0.967 -1.339 
(0.467) (0.569) (0.773) (1.213) 
3 -0.273 -0.249 -0.806 0.457 
(0.248) (0.371) (0.667) (0.304) 
2009:3 1 0.58 0.245 -1.622*** 0.368 
(1.182) (1.105) (0.488) (0.876) 
2 0.697** -0.993*** 0.109 -0.167 
(0.342) (0.259) (0.835) (0.806) 
3 -0.554** 0.172 -0.682 0.594* 
    (0.274) (0.286) (0.673) (0.329) 
   Note: The regression takes the form of ݕ௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ∑ ߚ௜ݕ௧ି௜ ൅ ∑ ߛ௜ସ௜ୀଵ ܱܫܮ௧ି௜ ൅ ∑ ߣ௜ସ௜ୀଵ ܼܧܴܱܥܱܴܴ௧ି௜ ൅ସ௜ୀଵ ߝ௧. 
   Significance is represented by *, **, and *** representing 10%, 5%, and 1% significance, respectively. 
   In Parentheses are the Newey and West (1987) heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard 
    errors corrected with twelve lags. 
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Table 1.3 Rolling Regression Adjusted R-Squared 
 
End 
Date k Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
1983:1 1 0.027 0.163 0.045 0.154 
2 0.561 0.637 0.591 0.657 
3 0.694 0.725 0.695 0.724 
4 0.761 0.797 0.765 0.796 
1991:2 1 0.046 0.179 0.014 0.152 
2 0.571 0.62 0.583 0.637 
3 0.698 0.712 0.695 0.722 
4 0.783 0.803 0.782 0.806 
2002:1 1 0.045 0.148 0.053 0.167 
2 0.562 0.596 0.586 0.617 
3 0.704 0.709 0.701 0.707 
4 0.77 0.788 0.776 0.793 
2009:3 1 0.279 0.366 0.259 0.359 
2 0.714 0.744 0.714 0.744 
3 0.814 0.823 0.816 0.825 
  4 0.862 0.863 0.86 0.861 
  Note: Rolling regressions are based on a 25 year window ending at the date provided. 
  The forecast horizon, in quarters, is represented by k. 
  Model 1: ݕ௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ∑ ߚ௜ ∗ ݕ௧ି௜ ସ௜ୀଵ ൅ ߝ௧, 
  Model 2: ݕ௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ∑ ߚ௜ ∗ ݕ௧ି௜ ସ௜ୀଵ ൅ ∑ ߛ௜ ∗ ܱܫܮ௧ି௜ସ௜ୀଵ ൅ ߝ௧ 
  Model 3: ݕ௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ∑ ߚ௜ ∗ ݕ௧ି௜ ସ௜ୀଵ ൅ ∑ ߣ௜ ∗ ܼܧܴܱܥܱܴܴ௧ି௜ସ௜ୀଵ ൅ ߝ௧ 
  Model 4: ݕ௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ∑ ߚ௜ ∗ ݕ௧ି௜ ସ௜ୀଵ ൅ ∑ ߛ௜ ∗ ܱܫܮ௧ି௜ସ௜ୀଵ ൅ ∑ ߣ௜ ∗ ܼܧܴܱܥܱܴܴ௧ି௜ସ௜ୀଵ ൅ ߝ௧ 
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Table 1.4 Recursive Regression Adjusted R-Squared 
 
End 
Date k Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
1983:1 1 0.110 0.201 0.165 0.240 
2 0.606 0.658 0.639 0.679 
3 0.746 0.766 0.750 0.768 
4 0.774 0.800 0.784 0.804 
1991:2 1 0.129 0.224 0.160 0.258 
2 0.620 0.661 0.640 0.678 
3 0.756 0.768 0.756 0.772 
4 0.786 0.803 0.791 0.807 
2002:1 1 0.125 0.204 0.158 0.237 
2 0.618 0.655 0.636 0.667 
3 0.754 0.764 0.755 0.766 
4 0.784 0.799 0.791 0.804 
2009:3 1 0.149 0.236 0.181 0.267 
2 0.636 0.677 0.652 0.688 
3 0.769 0.783 0.771 0.786 
  4 0.799 0.813 0.806 0.818 
  Note: Recursive regressions all start in 1947:4. 
  The forecast horizon, in quarters, is represented by k. 
  Model 1: ݕ௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ∑ ߚ௜ ∗ ݕ௧ି௜ ସ௜ୀଵ ൅ ߝ௧, 
  Model 2: ݕ௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ∑ ߚ௜ ∗ ݕ௧ି௜ ସ௜ୀଵ ൅ ∑ ߛ௜ ∗ ܱܫܮ௧ି௜ସ௜ୀଵ ൅ ߝ௧ 
  Model 3: ݕ௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ∑ ߚ௜ ∗ ݕ௧ି௜ ସ௜ୀଵ ൅ ∑ ߣ௜ ∗ ܼܧܴܱܥܱܴܴ௧ି௜ସ௜ୀଵ ൅ ߝ௧ 
  Model 4: ݕ௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ∑ ߚ௜ ∗ ݕ௧ି௜ ସ௜ୀଵ ൅ ∑ ߛ௜ ∗ ܱܫܮ௧ି௜ସ௜ୀଵ ൅ ∑ ߣ௜ ∗ ܼܧܴܱܥܱܴܴ௧ି௜ସ௜ୀଵ ൅ ߝ௧ 
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Table 1.5 Out of Sample Predictability 
 
  Rolling Recursive 
  Model 4 vs. Model 2 Model 3 vs. Model 1 Model 4 vs. Model 2 Model 3 vs. Model 1 
Date CW DMW CW DMW CW DMW CW DMW 
1983:01 2.205** 2.077*** 1.670** 1.513*** 1.511* 0.798** 1.989** 1.725*** 
1991:02 2.136** 1.965*** 1.166 0.514*** 1.626* 0.291** 1.169 0.001* 
2002:01 2.338*** 1.925*** 1.441* 0.295** 2.009** 0.135* 1.621* -0.053 
2009:03 2.328*** 1.916*** 1.416* 0.265** 2.033** 0.150* 1.687** 0.016* 
 
 Note: Significance is represented by *, **, and *** representing 10%, 5%, and 1% significance, 
 respectively. 
 CW and DMW stand for the Clark West, and Diebold Mariano West test statistics, respectively. 
 Model 1: ݕ௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ∑ ߚ௜ ∗ ݕ௧ି௜ ସ௜ୀଵ ൅ ߝ௧, 
 Model 2: ݕ௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ∑ ߚ௜ ∗ ݕ௧ି௜ ସ௜ୀଵ ൅ ∑ ߛ௜ ∗ ܱܫܮ௧ି௜ସ௜ୀଵ ൅ ߝ௧ 
 Model 3: ݕ௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ∑ ߚ௜ ∗ ݕ௧ି௜ ସ௜ୀଵ ൅ ∑ ߣ௜ ∗ ܼܧܴܱܥܱܴܴ௧ି௜ସ௜ୀଵ ൅ ߝ௧ 
 Model 4: ݕ௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ∑ ߚ௜ ∗ ݕ௧ି௜ ସ௜ୀଵ ൅ ∑ ߛ௜ ∗ ܱܫܮ௧ି௜ସ௜ୀଵ ൅ ∑ ߣ௜ ∗ ܼܧܴܱܥܱܴܴ௧ି௜ସ௜ୀଵ ൅ ߝ௧ 
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Table 1.6 Ratio of Mean Squared Prediction Errors 
 
Recursive MSPE ratio 
  1983:1 1991:2 2002:1 2009:3 
Model 3 vs. 1 0.950 1.000 1.002 1.000 
Model 4 vs. 2 0.975 0.991 0.996 0.997 
Rolling RMSE ratio 
  1983:1 1991:2 2002:1 2009:3 
Model 3 vs. 1 0.951 0.984 0.992 0.993 
Model 4 vs. 2 0.909 0.920 0.929 0.934 
Note: Formula is always nesting model/nested model 
Recursive regressions start in 1947:4. 
Rolling regressions start 25 years prior to the given date. 
Model 1: ݕ௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ∑ ߚ௜ ∗ ݕ௧ି௜ ସ௜ୀଵ ൅ ߝ௧, 
Model 2: ݕ௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ∑ ߚ௜ ∗ ݕ௧ି௜ ସ௜ୀଵ ൅ ∑ ߛ௜ ∗ ܱܫܮ௧ି௜ସ௜ୀଵ ൅ ߝ௧ 
Model 3: ݕ௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ∑ ߚ௜ ∗ ݕ௧ି௜ ସ௜ୀଵ ൅ ∑ ߣ௜ ∗ ܼܧܴܱܥܱܴܴ௧ି௜ସ௜ୀଵ ൅ ߝ௧ 
Model 4: ݕ௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ∑ ߚ௜ ∗ ݕ௧ି௜ ସ௜ୀଵ ൅ ∑ ߛ௜ ∗ ܱܫܮ௧ି௜ସ௜ୀଵ ൅ ∑ ߣ௜ ∗ସ௜ୀଵܼܧܴܱܥܱܴܴ௧ି௜ ൅ ߝ௧ 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Two 
Forecasting U.S. Recessions Using the Marginal Product of Capital 
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2.1 Introduction 
Forecasting turning points remains of great interest for all market participants, the 
challenge being if one can identify an impending recession. Recessions inflict an enormous 
cost on society: businesses risk bankruptcy, factories stay idle, workers are affected by 
unemployment, and policymakers deal with a greater apprehension. However, when 
forecasters choose to report probabilities, rather than point estimates, these forecasts are more 
informative and easy to use when quantifying the stance of the economy. Thus, better 
forecasts of turning point have the potential to improve standard model forecasts. Even 
though in the Unites States recessions have become milder and less frequent and 
expansionary periods more stable with the onset of the Great Moderation, the recent events 
show that recessions are as perilous as before. Therefore, any improvement in predicting 
recessions is highly valuable for the numerous economic agents. 
 It is common knowledge that recessions happen unexpectedly as a sudden decrease 
in economic activity, inflicting a high cost to the society.1 Economists find themselves put 
through a challenge when predicting recessions: they need to find a reliable indicator that 
mimics the movements of the business cycle reference series that has a significant and stable 
relationship, and improves the predictive power over time.  
 In this paper, we use a newly constructed indicator based on the correlation between 
marginal product of capital (MPK) in non-residential and residential sectors as an 
explanatory variable to a probit model to predict the likelihood of a recession in United 
States up to five quarters ahead both in-sample and out-of-sample. We consider two probit 
models for forecasting the binary variable that takes value 1 if there is a recession in the 
subsequent h quarters, and 0 otherwise. The baseline model uses the famous yield spread, 
                                                            
1 Tichy (1994) 
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and we build a second model with both yield spread and zero correlation indicator. The 
probit regression including the correlation indicator provides a better in-sample fit and is able 
to predict the 1990 recession out-of-sample. We then compare these forecasts with recession 
predictions based on the probability forecast provided by the Survey of Professional 
Forecasters (SPF). We find that SPF probability forecasts are worse at forecasting recessions 
for horizons beyond two quarters, with the implication that the indicator adds tremendous 
value to the standard yield curve model. 
The literature on predicting recessions had given somewhat pessimistic results: 
Diebold and Rudebusch (1991) found the index of leading indicators performing subpar, 
Stock and Watson (1993) dynamic single index modeled could not identify 1990 and 2001 
out-of-sample recessions, and Zaranowitz and Braun (1993) concluded that the largest 
prediction errors accompany recessions. The more optimistic strand of literature focuses on 
different variables that perform well in the predictability of recessions, namely, the slope of 
the yield curve as the difference between long- and short-run interest rates. The ability of 
yield spread in predicting recession was shown since late 1980s – early 1990s by Stock and 
Watson (1989), Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991), Hu (1993), Harvey (1991, 1997). The 
seminal work of Estrella and Mishkin (1998) has shown that yield spread is an excellent 
indicator in predicting US recessions and also dominates the index of leading indicators. 
Their work was strengthen by a series of papers on the predictive power of the yield spread 
by Chauvet and Potter (2005), Ang, Piazzesi, and Wei (2006), Wright (2006), and Rudebusch 
and Williams (2009). 
Unfortunately, the spread failed to predict the 1990-1991 recession, even though the 
spread narrowed and predicted somewhat weaker activity. Haubrich and Dombrosky (1996) 
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found that the yield spread is a relatively accurate predictor of four-quarter economic growth, 
except over the period 1985 to 1995. Also, the yield curve seems to have difficulty in 
predicting milder recessions, as shown in Dueker (1997). 
The focus of this paper is to examine the ability of the yield curve together with a 
new indicator in predicting recessions. We anticipate the new model to capture the 
controversial recession of 1990-1991 and also the milder recessions, harder to detect with the 
yield curve alone. The indicator presented in Stoica (2012) is based on a recurrent pattern 
observed across the business cycle beginning with the 1953 recession: between one to three 
quarters to the following recession, the correlation of sectoral MPK registers values close to 
zero, positive values in recoveries and expansions, and strongly negative across recessions. 
This behavior is likely due to the different response of the non-residential and residential 
sectors to monetary policy. The addition of this new indicator of monetary policy helps refine 
the signal in predicting a weakening in the economy. 
 The rationale of why an indicator based on the correlation of residential and non-
residential MPK might be useful is because it reacts to the movements in interest rates. For 
example, the higher the interest rates, the more restrictive the monetary policy, and more 
likely for a recession to follow.  
 When the economy is growing quickly, the Federal Reserve (Fed) adopts a more 
restrictive monetary policy by increasing interest rates in order to keep inflation around its 
target, in this case, a recession to materialize is very likely. The increasing interest rates are 
depressing investments in both sectors, but the real hit is going to be taken by the residential 
capital, rather sensitive to interest rates movements, so the residential MPK is going up 
toward the end of the expansion, while non-residential MPK starts going gradually down, 
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with a major drop at the beginning of the recession. This movement creates with 
approximately two quarters before a recession a close to zero correlation. 
 We provide new evidence that the yield curve is a very reliable indicator, performing 
even better when associated with the zero correlation measure. We proceed further by 
examining the information content of the probability forecasts provided by the respondents in 
the SPF, compare these forecasts to the yield curve, and zero correlation indicators. The SPF 
forecasts are considered by the literature to perform extremely well in evaluation exercises, 
estimating the probabilities of a negative growth in GDP in the current quarter through four 
quarters ahead quite accurately. 
 It became necessary to improve upon the standard yield curve model when it failed to 
predict the 1990 recession. This led many practitioners to discontinue the use of the yield 
curve, which may have worsened their forecast ability. Our indicator helps improve the 
predictive power of the yield curve in- and out-of-sample and picks up the 1990 recession, 
demonstrating that the yield curve is not obsolete. Even more, for longer horizons, the new 
model seems to do better than the yield curve alone. 
 We also provide evidence that the out-of-sample SPF probability forecasts perform 
better for one and two-quarters ahead than our probit model including the yield spread and 
zero correlation indicator. The predictive power of the SPF, however, disappears at three-, 
four-, and five-quarter ahead forecasts. Conversely, the probit model with yield spread and 
zero correlation indicator is performing significantly better than SPF forecasts probability at 
longer horizons, but for shorter horizons, SPF predicts the likelihood of a recession better. 
 The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we define and provide a short 
history on US recessions. In section 3, we describe the models and assess the in-sample 
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accuracy. Section 4 evaluates the out-of-sample forecast performance and provides a 
comparison of the models incorporating the zero correlation indicator as an explanatory 
variable with those of SPF forecasts, and we conclude in section 5 about the usefulness of 
our indicator in improving the likelihood of forecasting recessions. 
 
2.2 Defining Recessions 
The first step in our analysis is to define what we call “recession”. A very common 
use of the word recession was introduced by Arthur Okun and widely used since is that the 
beginning of a recession is defined by two consecutive quarters of decline in real GDP or 
what we call a “peak”. However, the authority in dating recessions in US, the National 
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) does not define a recession in terms of two 
consecutive quarters of decline in real GDP. Rather, a recession is a significant decline in 
economic activity spread across the economy, lasting more than a few months, normally 
visible in real GDP, real income, employment, industrial production, and wholesale-retail 
sales. A recession is a period between a peak and a trough, and an expansion is a period 
between a trough and a peak; most recessions are brief and they have been rare in recent 
decades. – (July 2003) 
The NBER’s Business Cycle Dating Committee determines the peaks and troughs of 
the business cycle, considering a collection of variables known as Leading Economic 
Indicators (LEI). Initially, Burns and Mitchell (1938) identified 21 series as reliable 
indicators out of 487 total chosen on their ability to forecast in-sample. The LEI list is 
periodically revised, some of the series could not forecast future recessions, or out-of-sample. 
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The current list has changed from the one originally proposed to about 10 variables.2 
Following Burns and Mitchell, Moore (1950, 1961) construct a new list of indicators by 
searching also for indicators of business contraction in addition to the expansion indicators. 
More recently, Stock and Watson (1989) used modern econometric techniques in revisiting 
the list of indicators. There are several papers discussing on NBER methodology of maintain 
US chronology of the business cycle, Diebold and Rudebusch (1989, 1992, 1996) and 
Aruoba, Diebold, and Scotti (2008). 
Faithful to Burns and Mitchell’s definition of business cycle, the NBER defined 
recessions tend to be longer than those defined by the two-quarter rule, as a consequence of 
the fact that NBER considers the months with very low growth as belonging to recessions 
rather than expansion. 
In our analysis, we use the NBER’s simple rule that links decline in GDP to 
recessions: The committee views real GDP as the single best measure of aggregate activity. 
In determining whether a recession has occurred and identifying its approximate dates of 
peak and the trough, the committee therefore places considerable weight on the estimates of 
real GDP issued by the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the U.S. Department of Commerce. 
 
2.3 The Models 
In this section, we study the ability of the yield curve and zero correlation indicator to 
predict recessions. Empirically, we would like to construct a model that translates the 
steepness of the yield curve at present time into a likelihood of a recession in the future and 
also connects it with the NBER definition of a recession. Our approach is to employ a probit 
model that converts the stance of monetary policy into a probability of a recession.  
                                                            
2 For a history if the revisions, see Conference Board  (1997) 
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 First, we estimate probit models and obtain the probability of a recession occurring 1 
to 5 quarters ahead, with information from the candidate series. Then, we analyze the in-
sample predictive content by examining the 2Rpseudo  . We also include information about 
the SPF probability forecasts, which will be used later in our analysis.  
2.3.1 Yield-curve and zero-correlation probability forecasts   
We consider alternative probit models to forecast NBER recessions at time t, with a 
forecast horizon of h periods. In a probit model, the variables included are chosen based on 
their likelihood to forecast recessions, rather than their ability to track past movements of 
economic indicators. The main strength of this approach is that it focuses solely on turning 
points, which might also be considered a weakness considering that recession are relatively 
rare events. 
Historically, the term spread or the slope of the yield curve has exhibited negative 
statistical correlation with real GDP growth over subsequent quarters, and a positive with the 
start of a recession. The term spread also constitutes part of several important indexes used in 
forecasting, such as the Conference Board and the Leading Economic Indicators(LEI). 
However, the yield curve did not signal the 1990 recession, causing it to lose a lot of its 
credibility, and also showed itself almost flat and modestly inverted in the eve of Great 
Recession. Nevertheless, the yield curve is still among the most performing recession 
indicators.  
The term spread is a useful indicator of the state of monetary policy. The reason 
behind this is that, theoretically, the term spread measures the difference between current and 
the average expected short-term interest rates under the expectations hypothesis. The higher 
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the spread, the tighter the monetary policy, and more likely for a recession to occur in the 
following quarters. 
Neglecting the effect of the term premium, it is not clear that the spread of short-term 
interest rates over the yield on a long-term bond should necessary capture all the information 
available about the likelihood of a recession.3 We believe that if this affirmation is right, we 
need a less complicated and more straightforward measure of the stance of monetary policy. 
The measure that we propose and previously used as a successful indicator in forecasting 
GDP growth comes as a complement to the yield curve, rather than a substitute. The 
indicator is based on the correlation between MPK in residential and non-residential sectors, 
which becomes significantly close to zero before a recession, excepting the 2007-2009 
recession.  
We believe that the indicator is appropriate when dealing with the likelihood of a 
recession because is largely driven by residential investment being much more interest rate 
sensitive and less income sensitive than non-residential investment. The best example is to 
think about the end of an expansion. Commonly, when the economy is heating up and the 
inflation starts being of concern, the Fed increases interest rates and depresses investment in 
order to keep inflation near its target. As a consequence of the interest rates’ behavior, 
between one to three quarters preceding recessions, the correlation of the non-residential and 
residential MPK becomes essentially zero. A graphical representation of the two variables 
used in this study can be visualized in Figure 2.1. 
The exception from this rule is the Great Recession of 2007-2009. One possible 
explanation would be that it did not come as a result of high and increasing interest rates, or a 
Fed “induced” recession, but more likely as a outcome of the Financial Crisis. 
                                                            
3 Jonathan Wright (2006) 
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Data on the yield curve is obtained from the St. Louis Federal Reserve Database. 
Following Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991), we define the spread, St
L
tt iiYS  , as the 
difference between the yield on a 10-year Treasury note, Lti , and the yield on a 3-month 
Treasury bill, Sti .  Our first model then is one of the baseline specifications for comparing 
probability forecasts and it comprises the value of yield spread: 
)      (Model                              )         YSΦ(α)P(NBER htt 11    
 where 

otherwise. 0,
quarter tin recession  defined NBERan   is  thereif , 1
NBER t   
).Φ(  is the standard normal cumulative distribution function, ty  is the annualized GDP 
growth at time t, and the forecast horizon h = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. The information at time t-h 
includes the information of t-h-1. The fitted values can be interpreted as the probability that a 
recession will occur, conditional on the observed value of the yield spread. 
  A second model builds on the first with the inclusion of the zero correlation variable, 
described in Stoica (2012). We include the new indicator based on the predictive power of 
real economic activity in- and out-of-sample specification and also on its ability to capture 
the explicit turning point from trough to peak. This indicator is very similar to Hamilton’s 
(2003) oil price shock, the only difference being that it takes 0 and 1 values. 
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2.3.2 SPF probability forecasts 
Forecasts are vital for economic conditions. Dean Croushore (1993) suggested that 
“one easy way to get forecasts is to subscribe to a survey of forecasts, such as the Survey of 
Professional Forecasters.” Every quarter beginning with 1968:4, the American Statistical 
Association (ASA) together with National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) survey 
various professional forecasters on subjective estimates of real GNP/GDP declines during the 
current quarter and four subsequent quarters.4 In 1990, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia 
took over the survey and invited new forecasters, boosting the number of respondents to 36.5 
We are mostly interested in the particular question that asses the probability of a 
decline in GDP. The question is phrased as follows: “indicate the probability you would 
attach to a decline in real GDP (chain-weighted basis, seasonally adjusted) in the next five 
quarters. Write in a figure that may range from 0 to 100 in each of the cells (100 means a 
decline in the given quarter is certain, 0 means is no change at all).” By notation, in response 
to this question asked at time t-h, we call the mean probability forecast at time t SPFhttP | .  
If one were to graph the SPF probability forecasts, with a high degree of certainty we 
can comment that SPF forecasts do not give any relevant information for four- and five-
quarter ahead forecasts, but perform extremely well in identify negative growth for the next 
quarter.  
2.3.3 In-sample results 
The in-sample results are based on probit models for the yield curve model and the 
yield curve and zero correlation indicator estimated over the whole sample, 1953:2 through 
                                                            
4 The forecasters in the Survey of Professional Forecasters come largely from the business world and Wall 
Street. 
5 See Croushore (1993) 
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2011:1. The fitted values are then compared with the actual NBER recession dates. We are 
interested to show that the second model has higher predictive power across all horizons. 
In the classical regression model, the in-sample predictive power is analyzed by 
comparing the 2 Radjusted for each regression model. The model with the highest value of 
2 Radjusted  is said to have the best explanatory power. However, in a probit model, the 
simple 2 Radjusted  is biased toward 1.6 
The measure of comparison is a modified McFadden’s 2R  called 2Rpseudo 
developed to correspond intuitively to the widely used coefficient of determination in a 
standard linear regression. The 2Rpseudo   takes value between 0 and 1, with the 
interpretation of no fit for 0, and perfect fit for 1. 
Lcn
c
u
L
LRpseudo
log)/2(
2
log
log
1




  
where uL  is the unconstrained maximum value of the likelihood function L, cL  its maximum 
value under the constraint that all coefficients are zero except for the constant, and n is the 
number of observations.  
As in the linear regression case, the measure of goodness of fit is not sufficient for 
statistical hypothesis testing for horizons over two quarters. The longer the forecast horizon 
than the observation interval, the more likely the forecast errors to be correlated. To correct 
this bias, we use the Newey-West (1987) technique and present t-statistic calculated using 
robust errors adjusted for autocorrelation.7 
                                                            
6 To bias is discussed more in Estrella (1998) 
7 Estrella and Rodrigues (1998) 
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Concretely, to compare the in-sample performance, we estimate a 25-year rolling 
regression, with the first one starting in 1948:1, and moving forward by one quarter at a time.  
We forecast the probability of the economy being in a recession at time t for horizons one to 
five quarters ahead.  We compute the 2Rpseudo  statistic for both Model 1 and Model 2 
comparing them with higher values indicating a better in-sample performance.  The 
2Rpseudo  statistics are reported as occurring in the last quarter of the associated 
regression, for example, if the regression is from 1975:1-2000:1, then 2Rpseudo   from this 
regression is reported as the pseudo-R-squared for 2000:1.  It is important to note that 
2Rpseudo   does not penalize for model size, so very small differences from Model 1 to 
Model 2 indicate no improvement in fit 
Table 1 presents the 2Rpseudo   for Model 1 and Model 2 with lags ranging from 1 
to 5 quarters. The 2Rpseudo  is visibly higher for Model 2 than Model 1 until 1990 and 
from 1995-1999 for one and two quarter ahead forecasts, until 1990 for three quarters ahead, 
until 2006 for four quarters ahead and from 1987-2003 for five quarters ahead. A better 
representation could be seen in Figure 2.2. 
The advantage of using a probit model is that it allows us to estimate the probabilities 
that the economy will be in recession in the following quarters on the basis of the interest rate 
spread and interest rate sensitivity to activity in different sectors of the economy, observed 
some quarters ago. Figure 3 graphs these fitted probabilities using the spread and zero 
correlation measure. The probability forecasts should be 1 in a recession, shaded in the 
figure, and zero for the rest of the time. The estimated probabilities increases during 
recession periods and remains low during in non-recession quarters. For the 1990 recession, 
Model 2 gives a fair warning, the estimated probability increases to the value of 0.57 in 
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1989:4 for one quarter ahead horizon, 0.63 in 1990:1 for the two quarter ahead horizon, 
likewise, 0.64 in 1990:2, 0.61 in 1990:3, and 0.60 in 1990:4 for three, four, and five quarters 
ahead, respectively. The model seems to perform fairly well. 
As seen in Figure 2.3, the yield spread itself predicts the in-sample probability of a 
recession fairly well, except the 1990-1991 recession. Adding the zero correlation indicator 
that incorporates tight monetary policy helps in forecasting recessions. 
 
2.4 Out-of-sample results  
 The main drawback of in-sample forecasting is that it is using information not 
available at the time of the forecast. For example, the probability of a recession in 2001 was 
calculated estimating the model on the whole period, from 1953:2 to 2011:1. Moreover, the 
in-sample forecast always performs better when including more explanatory variables. In 
order to avoid the overfitting problems that might arise and misleading indicators of the true 
ability of predicting recessions, we perform an out-of-sample forecasting exercise. The out-
of-sample forecasts are improved by using only information available to market participants 
at the time of the forecast. 
 First, we estimate the likelihood of a recession for out-of-sample forecasts. Next, we 
assess the forecasting performance of the probit models looking at forecast errors. Finally, 
we compare the accuracy of our best model (Model 2) with the SPF forecasts. 
2.4.1 Assessing probability forecasts 
In this section, we evaluate the performance of yield curve and zero correlation 
indicator when used to predict turning points. We evaluate each type of forecast in terms of 
accuracy at an h quarters horizon using three common measures: 
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1. Mean absolute value (MAE) 
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These measures evaluate the probability forecasts by looking at the average closeness of the 
predicted probability to the observed realization as measured by the NBER dummy variable 
denoting the NBER recession quarters. The first two measures, MAE and RMSE, provide 
standard summary measures of forecasting performance. The third measure, LPS, 
corresponds to the loss function that assigns more weight to larger forecast errors. The range 
of LPS is [0,∞], with the interpretation that a value closer to 0 indicates perfect accuracy. The 
MAE has the clear advantage of performing better in-sample and out-of-sample, while LPS 
and RMSE loss function penalizes the predictive ability of yield curve and zero correlation 
indicator over SPF. 
 Table 2 provides accuracy evaluations for each of the models, Model 1, Model 2, and 
SPF reported forecasts, at each of the available horizons (h= 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) for the sample 
beginning in 1973:4 through 1998:1. The results show that Model 2 yields smaller forecast 
errors than both Model 1 and SPF for all three criteria (RMSE, MAE, and LPS) for the four- 
and five quarter ahead forecasts. For two and three quarter ahead horizons, Model 2 forecasts 
are more accurate with MAE, but Model 1 seems to outperform Model 2 and SPF when 
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using RMSE and LPS. The SPF forecast does better than the considered models for the short 
horizon of one-quarter ahead. 
2.4.2 Comparing yield curve and yield curve plus zero correlation forecasts 
To compare the forecasting ability of the model including the yield curve (Model 1) 
and the model augmented by zero correlation indicator (Model 2), we use Diebold-Mariano 
(1995), and West (1996) test, hence DMW. We test the null hypothesis that the forecasting 
performance of this two models, measured in MAE, RMSE, LPS, is equally good against 
one-sided alternative, or in other words, we test the null hypothesis of the DMW test is of 
equal predictability for both forecasts (we test the hypothesis of equal expected absolute 
errors). 
 We first calculate the loss differential for the three accuracy measure at a horizon h 
as follows: 
t
YSZC
httt
YS
httt NBERPNBERPMAEentialLossDiffer   ||)(  
The DMW test cannot be computed for an RMSE loss function, so instead we report the 
results for the Mean Square Error (MSE) test: 
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The Loss Differential function for the Log Score Probability measure conveys better 
results as shown is West (1996), because the parameter estimation error disappears when the 
in-sample objective corresponds with the out-of-sample loss function: 
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 Next step is to compute the DMW test statistic by regressing each loss function 
differentials on a constant and test the significance using robust standard errors for 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation corrections. If the parameter uncertainty is accounted 
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for, the asymptotic distribution of DMW may depend on nuisance parameters, and the 
standard theory does not apply. Because the models are nested, we cannot use the standard 
critical values, instead we use McCracken (2007) critical values. 
The comparison between Model 1 and Model 2 leads to mixed results, often with the 
models not being significantly different from each other. The five-quarter ahead forecast 
horizon is the most consistent across measures of performance with Model 2 significantly 
outperforming Model 1from 1988 to 1999 for MAE, 1990 to 2002 for MSE, and 1990 to 
2001 for LPS. Table 3 displays these results for 1998:1.  Similarly, for four quarters ahead 
we find that Model 2 performs significantly better from 1990 to1998 for LPS, and MSE, and 
from 1983 to 1998 for MAE.  Three quarters ahead forecasts are very mixed with Model 2 
always significantly better with MAE, never significantly better with LPS, and with MSE it 
is only significantly better for one quarter in 2007.  The two-quarter ahead horizon has Model 
2 performing significantly better from 1983 to 1990 and in 1998 for MAE, but never for LPS 
or MSE.  Finally, for the one-quarter ahead horizon, Model 2 is always significantly better 
than Model 1 for the MAE, never for the LPS, and from 1987 to 1989 for MSE. 
2.4.3 Comparing yield curve plus zero correlation indicator and SPF forecasts 
For the comparison of our better model and SPF forecasts, we are going to employ 
exactly the same method as for the previous comparison, DWM test. 
 Again, the loss differential functions for each of the proposed measures at a horizon: 
t
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 As previously, we compute the DMW test statistic by regressing each loss function 
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differentials on a constant and test its significance using robust standard errors for 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation corrections (HAC), or Newey-West HAC. When 
comparing Model 1 and Model 2 against the SPF standard critical values are a good 
approximation because we do not know what goes in to the SPF forecasts, so the assumption 
is that they are not nested in Model 1 or Model 2, and likewise the models are not nested in 
the SPF forecasts.   
Comparing Model 2 with the SPF forecasts, we find that for five-quarters ahead 
Model 2 always performs better than the SPF for all three metrics. Four-quarters ahead is 
similar, with Model 2 outperforming the SPF for MAE and MSE for the entire sample, and 
for LPS between 1989 and 2009, with no significant difference otherwise. For the three-
quarter ahead forecasts, MAE is still always significantly better than the SPF, MSE is also 
performing better, except for one quarter in 2009, while LPS is only significantly better from 
2001 to 2009. Two quarters ahead Model 2 outperforms the SPF until 2009 according to the 
MAE, but with the MSE and LPS there is no significant difference. Finally, for the one-
quarter forecasts ahead the SPF performs significantly better for all three metrics. 
Predicting the 1990 recession is one of the places where the yield curve comes up 
short.  It fails to capture the 1990 recession at any of the considered forecast horizons.  
However, when the zero correlation indicator is included we are able to capture the 1990 
recession. Figure 2.4 displays the forecasted probabilities for both models and the SPF. For 
the four- and five-quarter ahead horizons, we are no more than one quarter off at either the 
beginning or end of that recession. Considering the three quarters ahead forecast, we predict 
that the will begin recession shortly before it starts, and that it will end shortly before its 
conclusion. Finally, one- and two-quarter ahead forecasts predict that the 1990 recession 
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starts in 1989 and ends before the onset of the actual recession. While the timing is a little 
inaccurate for one- to three-quarter ahead forecast horizons, we still view this as adding 
important information about the state of the economy, picking up that there is trouble before 
it actually happens.  
 
2.5 Conclusion     
There is a great deal of interest in forecasting recessions, but the profession has not 
always kept a flawless track record when detecting their likelihood. The main shortcoming 
reported was that the 1990-1991 recession was not captured using the usual forecasting 
indicators. This view, however, is contradicted by new evidence on the usefulness of the 
yield curve. In this paper, we confirm the importance of the yield curve when we also include 
an indicator of monetary policy based on the non-residential and residential MPK correlation. 
We show that the predictive power of this model is superior to the predictions of professional 
macroeconomic forecasters on longer forecast horizons. 
We first employ two non-linear model specifications to forecast the probability of a 
recession: the standard probit model proposed by Estrella and Mishkin (1998) of the yield 
curve and a modified model of the yield curve augmented by the zero correlation indicator. 
Both in-sample and out-of-sample results conclude that the second model is superior and it 
appears to contain useful information about the monetary policy, including for the difficult to 
forecast period of 1989-1999.  
Second, in order to provide evidence on the importance of the new indicator as a 
complement to the yield spread, we compare the predictive ability of the model with the 
Survey of Professional Forecasters probabilities for one to five-quarter ahead horizon. We 
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find that our model produces better forecasts of recessions than the SPF at horizons beyond 
two quarters, and especially for four- and five-quarters ahead. This conclusion is still current 
and stayed true for the past 20 years. 
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2.6 Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 2.1 Yield Curve and Zero Correlation 
 
 
 Note: Recession Dates are shaded 
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Figure 2.2 Model 1 and Model 2 Pseudo R-Squared 
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Figure 2.3 Model 1 and Model 2 Fitted Recession Probabilities 
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Figure 2.4 SPF, Model 1, and Model 2 Forecasted Recession Probabilities 
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Table 2.1 In Sample Performance 
 
  h=1 h=2 h=3 h=4 h=5 
Model 1 
Pseudo R-squared 0.023 0.081 0.192 0.276 0.331 
t-stat (yield curve) -1.287 -2.169 -2.743 -3.467 -3.909 
Model 2 
Pseudo R-squared 0.023 0.083 0.194 0.277 0.331 
t-stat (yield curve) -1.367 -2.283 -2.868 -3.61 -4.179 
t-stat (zero correlation) -0.163 -0.417 0.65 0.253 0.25 
  
       Note: Larger Pseudo R-Squared is better and significant t-stats are desirable. 
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Table 2.2 Probability Forecast Evaluation 1998:1 
 
  RMSE MAE LPS 
1 QUARTER AHEAD 
MODEL 1 0.346 0.235 0.393 
MODEL 2 0.350 0.230 0.400 
SPF 0.271 0.180 0.247 
2 QUARTERS AHEAD 
MODEL 1 0.298 0.165 0.311 
MODEL 2 0.308 0.164 0.333 
SPF 0.325 0.239 0.340 
3 QUARTERS AHEAD 
MODEL 1 0.286 0.147 0.291 
MODEL 2 0.287 0.142 0.311 
SPF 0.367 0.277 0.423 
4 QUARTERS AHEAD 
MODEL 1 0.319 0.182 0.342 
MODEL 2 0.311 0.174 0.333 
SPF 0.393 0.298 0.482 
5 QUARTERS AHEAD 
MODEL 1 0.319 0.198 0.319 
MODEL 2 0.308 0.189 0.303 
SPF 0.410 0.313 0.527 
   Note: The smaller the statistic, the better the forecast. 
   The smallest statistic for each horizon is in bold. 
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Table 2.3 Diebold Mariano West Test Results 1998:1 
 
  MSE MAE LPS 
1 QUARTER AHEAD 
MODEL 1 VS SPF -2.561 -2.687 -2.647 
MODEL 2 VS SPF -2.594 -2.358 -2.573 
MODEL 2 VS MODEL 1 -0.855 0.959 -0.766 
2 QUARTERS AHEAD 
MODEL 1 VS SPF 0.563 3.658 0.288 
MODEL 2 VS SPF 0.233 3.445 -0.049 
MODEL 2 VS MODEL 1 -1.434 0.208 -1.636 
3 QUARTERS AHEAD 
MODEL 1 VS SPF 2.535 7.009 1.825 
MODEL 2 VS SPF 2.329 6.600 1.248 
MODEL 2 VS MODEL 1 -0.126 0.934 -1.188 
4 QUARTERS AHEAD 
MODEL 1 VS SPF 2.129 5.900 2.065 
MODEL 2 VS SPF 2.286 6.000 2.109 
MODEL 2 VS MODEL 1 1.142 1.373 0.859 
5 QUARTERS AHEAD 
MODEL 1 VS SPF 2.830 6.078 3.592 
MODEL 2 VS SPF 3.032 6.379 3.766 
MODEL 2 VS MODEL 1 1.527 2.018 1.682 
        Note: When one Model is Nested in the other, use McCracken Critical  
         Values, otherwise (for SPF comparisons) standard critical values are  
      appropriate. 
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Appendix: Business Cycle. Recessions and Expansions. 
Before each of the past six out of seven recessions, the interest rates rose, with the 
exception of Great Recession, when interest rates hit historic lows. Often, Fed engages in 
contractionary monetary policy when the expected inflation is higher than their target, by 
increasing short-term interest rates, and initially long-run interest rates also rises, but not as 
much as the short-term rate. The result of Fed’s policy of monetary tightening is often 
generating recessions.1 On the other hand, when the economy is weak, Fed loosens monetary 
policy by decreasing interest rates. Below is a succinct characterization of the behavior of 
interest rates for both recessions and expansions for seven of the last cycles. This is necessary 
for a better understanding of the comportment of the marginal products of capital and their 
evolution across the business cycle. In a recession, we are expecting to see a decrease in the 
non-residential MPK as a result of the decline in non-residential income. The non-residential 
capital does not see major changes, because it is not appallingly sensitive to the interest rates 
increase. The best way to think of this scenario is to consider businesses and the fact that they 
are driven by their returns. The residential MPK during a recession behaves differently.  
First, the residential income is quite sticky due to the measurement issues. Second, the 
residential capital is highly sensitive to the movement in interest rate, because households are 
more credit constrained. Therefore, an increase in interest rates leads to a decline of 
residential capital. The outcome of these two facts put together is an increase in residential 
MPK, mostly as a consequence of unadjusted income. 
We start chronologically by characterizing the interest rates' behavior and sectoral 
marginal product of capital evolution during both recessions and the following expansions 
                                                            
1 See Goodfriend (1993) 
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and graph them in figures A1 through A6. We are particularly interested in proving that there 
is a pattern associated with each recession and expansion, that will allow me to use a new 
measure for forecasting real GDP growth. 
The 1960 recession lasted 4 quarters and followed only 8 quarters after the previous 
one. It was one of the mild monetary recessions, with a fall in GNP of 1.6% starting after 
FED raised the interest rates in 1959 to tackle huge inflation and gold outflows. The reserve 
requirement and discount rate were both cut in August, both successful measures in ending 
the recession in February. The correlation between Residential and Non-residential marginal 
product of capital was highly negative, featuring a value of -0.85. Marginal product of non-
residential capital went down 1 percentage points from a value of 10.43% to 9.46%, as 
opposed to the marginal product of residential capital which went up by just a very little from 
3.78% to 3.85%.  
The expansion that followed was the second longest (1961:2 – 1969:3) lasting for 8 
years. The policy directive was moderate, exhibiting rapid growth and the federal funds rate 
started rising after the trough. Inflation stayed at low values until 1965, when it began rising 
and so did the interest rates, but the Fed could not control the inflation growth. Further 
increases in interest rates caused the “credit crunch” of 1966, which happily was only a 
growth slowdown.  This expansion was somewhat atypical from the point of view of 
correlation of marginal product of residential and non-residential capital, with a negative 
correlation of -0.19 strongly driven by the last 2 quarters of data. For most of the following 
expansions, the two series moved together for the whole sample. Both of the series had the 
same upward course until the mid of the expansion, after which the non-residential marginal 
product went by a very little bit down and the residential went up. For the whole expansion 
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time, the growth in MPK residential (12%) was almost double than for the non-residential 
MPK (6.2%). The values for MPK non-residential in 1961:2 was 10.13% and 3.83% for 
MPK non-residential, reaching in 1969:3 10.76%, respectively 4.29%. If we go back two 
quarters before the next recession starts and measure the correlation again, we find a value 
remarkably closer to zero. 
The 1969 recession was relatively mild and followed a long expansion. The end of 
the expansion was characterized by high inflation. The Fed attempted monetary tightening 
and fiscal tightening was also used for closing the deficit caused by the Vietnam War. The 
result was slow money growth, declining interest rates and a very slow reduction in inflation 
rate. Real GNP fell only by 0.6%. The correlation between MPK residential and non-
residential unlike for the rest of the recessions is positive, 0.62. The main reason for this is 
the length of the recession, only 5 quarters, being considered not only short, but the public 
got the information of a recession happening after the recession ended and did not react to the 
market uncertainty. As a general trend, MPK residential stayed unchanged at a value of 
4.29%, while MPK non-residential fluctuated, reaching a value of 9.67% at the end of the 
recession. 
  The 1971:1 to 1973:4 expansion was short, but settling lower interest rates and higher 
money growth, even though the recovery was sluggish and unemployment did not pick up 
until 1971:3. The expansionary period was an effort of keeping unemployment under control 
and at a lower level, the Nixon administration imposing unsuccessful wage control. The 
result was a crazy increase in inflation. Not surprisingly, the expansion is too short for a clear 
interpretation of the agent’s behavior in residential and non-residential sector, and from the 
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perspective of the correlation in marginal product of capital, it seemed like investors acted 
with a lag, as if the recession never ended.  
The recession of 1973 was significantly worse than  the previous ones and even more 
aggravated by the quadrupling of oil prices in 1973 and stock market crash 1973 - 1974. It 
lasted 6 quarters, and registered the highest drop in GDP (-3.2%) and increase in both 
inflation and unemployment. In the first quarter on 1975, Fed adopted a more aggressive 
policy continued even after the recession ended, cutting federal funds rates, discounts rate 
and reserve requirement, desired for a higher money growth, because the problem of high 
unemployment was very pressing. The government spending was higher than before because 
of the Vietnam War, leading to stagflation. The recession also significantly affected the non-
residential sector, with a declining marginal product of capital from 10.8% in 1973:4 to 
8.02% in 1975:1. MPK of residential sector stayed almost constant with a very small increase 
from 4.21% to 4.30% for the same time frame. The correlation of the two was -0.74.   
 The expansion started in 1975:2 and lasted until 1977:4 and continued with worrying 
level of inflation. The evolution of the MPKs was somewhat stagnant, with a very slight 
decrease in the residential MPK and almost no overall change for the non-residential sector, 
even though it registered quarter-to-quarter fluctuations of almost 1%. Again, we are 
interested to see when is the first time that we can see a zero correlation between the series, 
and not surprisingly, we find it two quarters before the preceding recession. 
The NBER considers the 1980 Recession a short recession, followed by a short 
period of recovery and another deep recession. This period is known in the literature as the 
“double-dip” recession or “W-shaped” recession. The first part of the double-dip recession 
was mainly about lowering the 1970s high inflation and fighting 1979’s energy crisis. The 
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newly appointed chairman of Federal Reserve, Paul Volker, declared war against inflation, 
raising the interest rates dramatically. This was the largest increase in federal funds rate since 
the beginning of the Fed, which had to be abandoned in the third quarter of 1980 in the light 
of decelerated economic activity. FOMC imposed the necessary credit controls, leading to a 
decline in consumer credit, which caused a chain reaction of low consumption and decrease 
in GDP. At beginning of the very short expansion, Fed reversed the strategy (expansionary 
monetary policy) by decreasing the federal funds rate and increasing the money base. There 
is not too much to be said about the correlation of the marginal products of non-residential 
and residential capital, considering the short span of only 3 quarters for both recession and 
expansion. The non-residential MPK stayed constant during recession, but increased exactly 
at the switch between recession and expansion by 13.7%, to go down again until the end of 
the expansion. Residential MPK increased at a steady low step in both stages of the business 
cycle. The recovery in the expansion was surprisingly rapid, but the inflation rate got again 
under control in the second quarter of 1981, causing the second wave of recession from 
1981:3 to 1982:4.2 Fed adopted contractionary monetary policy, increasing the federal funds 
rate and discount rate. This new wave of measures accomplished the desired result of 
reducing the inflation rate, from about 10% in early 1981 to about 4% in 1983, but at the cost 
of a sharp and very prolonged recession. Although the rate of inflation was at a low value, 
there was more concern regarding solvency, especially in the light of new debt default in the 
Latin America. In the last 6 quarters of double dip recession, the marginal product of 
residential capital went constantly up from 4.50% to 4.71%, while the non-residential went 
up for two quarters, and down in the last 4 from 8.84%  to 7.78%. The correlation was -0.79. 
After a new reduction in interest rate, a lengthy expansion started with most indicators 
                                                            
2 Fed raised the federal funds rate from 14.7% in March to 19.1% in June. 
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growing rapidly, including undesirable unemployment. Monetary policy tightened again 
somewhat, but nothing so radical as in the 1981 recession. The marginal product of both 
residential and non-residential capital went up, from 4.73% to 4.98%and 7.15% to 8.06% 
respectively. This is very much in line with Fed’s monetary policy. For the whole length of 
the expansion, the correlation is MPK series was highly positive, recording a value of 4% in 
the last quarter. This time, we do not see the zero correlation two-quarter rule before 
recession, but in the last quarter of the expansion, the value of the correlation is close to zero. 
After a long expansion of 26 quarters, the contractionary monetary policy led to the 
mild and short 1990 recession.3 The increasing interest rates for a three year period (1986 – 
1989) might not have caused a recession this time, if they wouldn’t have been accompanied 
by another oil shock, after Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990. The new bank regulations 
after the Savings and Loan Crises of 1980s, the accumulated debt and the consumer 
pessimism contributed to the 3 quarter recession. The evolution of MPK is too short to make 
any certain affirmation, but we do see a slight decrease in non-residential and a slight 
increase in residential. The following expansion was the longest and most prosperous in 
American history that lasted for ten years. Fed played an impressive role in keeping inflation 
under control, especially in 1993:1, when a tighter policy was put in place for almost a year. 
The residential and non-residential sectors commoved most of the time, with several 
occasions when marginal product of residential capital went up and the non-residential down. 
The correlation for the whole expansion period was -0.22, driven mostly of the last three 
quarters before recession. MPK residential increased to 5.49% from a previous  value of 
5.08, and non-residential MPK decreased at 7.02% from 7.60%As always, our main focus is 
                                                            
3 The decrease in real GDP was only 1.4% 
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the correlation right before the following recession. This time, we can see the zero correlation 
of the series with 3 quarters ahead of the recession, but the story still holds. 
Several factors facilitated 2001 recession: the tragedy of September 11th attacks, the 
speculative dot-com bubble, and a decrease in business investment. Fortunately, the recession 
was brief (4 quarters) and didn’t affect the growth of main indicators notably. Like the 
previous recession, there were concerns about a “jobless recovery” employment not being 
able to pick up. A contractionary course of action could not be avoided on time, and the 
federal funds rate decreased to a historical low of 1% in 2003:2, accompanied by the real 
short-term interest rates reaching almost 0% in 2002:2. From the point of view of correlation 
of non-residential and residential MPK, this recession looked very much like the one in 1969, 
recording a positive value of 0.46. Both MPKs decreased in the 4 recession quarters by 1% in 
residential sector, and 3% in non-residential. Naturally, Fed started to be apprehensive about 
deflation during this expansion and alarmed to the perspective of an inflationary future, 
federal funds rates had been risen 0.25 percentage points until 2007:3. This expansion is 
totally unusual from all the others if we are looking at the evolution of residential and non-
residential MPK, the residential in decreasing by 7% for the whole expansion’s duration, 
which is not unexpected considering that we were in a housing bubble, while the MPK 
residential increases just a half of the increase in residential,  from 6.25% to 6.41%. 
Consequently, the correlation in -0.51 and it stays negative for the whole sample period. This 
is the only expansion that does not conform to the story of recession predicted by the 
correlation between residential and non-residential MPK. No matter how many quarters we 
go back, we never find the desired zero correlation, hence the last expansion was different 
and it only could have led to a “different” recession. 
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The Great recession of 2007 or subprime mortgage crisis is probably the most 
severe postwar event. It led to the end of housing bubble and caused a financial crisis 
dangerous for the health of global economies. It was the longest postwar recession and 
caused the higher drop in real GDP (4.1%) and alarming high rates of unemployment (10.2% 
as of July 2010). One of the major factors that headed toward this direction was the lack of 
prudent lending. Prior loose monetary policy ending in 2004 and alarmingly slow growth of 
employment is believed to only aggravate the falling housing related assets and create the 
credit crunch. Tight monetary policy was reflected in the escalating federal funds rate, which 
was replaced by expansionary policy, cutting the federal funds rates close to 0%. For now, 
we know only that the correlation of MPK in residential and non-residential sector were 
highly negatively correlated (-0.87), with descending values in the non-residential sector and 
ascending in the residential. 
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Appendix: Figures 
Figure A1 MPK Residential and Non-Residential 1960-1971 
 
  Note: MPKR left axis, MPKNR right axis 
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Figure A2 MPK Residential and Non-residential 1969-1975 
 
 
  Note: MPKR left axis, MPKNR right axis 
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Figure A3 MPK Residential and Non-residential 1973-1980 
 
  Note: MPKR left axis, MPKNR right axis 
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Figure A4 MPK Residential and Non-residential 1981-1991 
 
 
  Note: MPKR left axis, MPKNR right axis 
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Figure A5 MPK Residential and Non-Residential 1990-2001 
 
  Note: MPKR left axis, MPKNR right axis 
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Figure A6 MPK Residential and Non-Residential 2001-2009 
 
  Note: MPKR left axis, MPKNR right axis 
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